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"You Can't Make Me!": How Expectations of
Parental Control over Adolescents Influence the Law
Judith G. McMullen*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a widespread belief in our society that good parents
consistently exercise firm, loving, and successful control over their
offspring. This belief system maintains that during a child's minority,
"good" families have parents and children who communicate with each
other, parents who consistently recognize and act in their children's best
interests, and children who respond with appropriate behavior and
conformity to their parents' expectations. A corollary of this set of
assumptions is that the goodness of a child's parenting can be measured
by the goodness of that child's behavior: good children have been raised
well, and badly behaved children have parents who have not followed
the tenets of good parenting. Of course, if parents are responsible for
how their offspring turn out, it is logical to hold the parents responsible
for any havoc created by their children. This purported cause-effect
relationship is ignored rather abruptly beginning at the age of majority
(typically age eighteen). Thereafter, the law treats children as adults;
they are treated as capable of self-determination (except for
consumption of alcohol) and are held legally accountable for their
1
actions.
While it is common knowledge that advice-giving relatives and selfappointed child-rearing experts can be extremely critical of parents
whose children behave badly, it is recognized less commonly that some
of these same presumptions have crept into judicial opinions and state
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Dame.
1. In reality, it is not quite so simple. While a few states retain twenty-one as the age of
majority, most states use age eighteen as the benchmark. However, children can be held
responsible for criminal behavior at much younger ages, sometimes being waived into adult court
as early as age ten. See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE
LAW 399 (2002).
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or local ordinances. Efforts to hold parents legally accountable for the
illegal or merely undesirable behavior of their offspring are common.
For small children who can be controlled physically, this makes sense.
Yet, many efforts to hold parents accountable focus on adolescents or
pre-teens: children who may be adult-sized and who may well have
adult-sized opinions, if not the maturity and judgment to go with them.
Much has been written about adolescents and pre-adolescents, and
many theorists have concluded that even the most diligent parents
cannot fully control the behavior of every child in every circumstance.
If this is true, we need to analyze whether parental accountability makes
sense as a legal policy.
Of course, the most straightforward justification for holding parents
accountable is that they have, or should have, effective control over
their children right up until the age of majority. As we will see,
however, the vast majority of authors of current parenting literature
concede (some more readily than others) that parents do not have
control over their adolescent and pre-adolescent children. 2 The rare
author claiming that parents do have control advocates physical
discipline so extreme that it is unlikely to become the norm in this
society. 3
Nonetheless, there are at least three other possible
justifications for a presumption that parents can control their older
children.
First, holding parents accountable for the misbehavior of their older
children may be the most economically efficient way to ensure that the
children receive as much positive influence as possible. 4 Motivating
parents to parent more effectively increases the likelihood that
constructive action will be taken by those persons in the best position to
positively affect their children's attitudes and behavior. As a closer
examination of the child-rearing materials will reveal, however, this
parental influence can sometimes look like parental control, but it is not
the same thing. 5 Hence, justice may require that parental accountability
not be absolute where proper assertion of parental influence has
occurred, even if the influence has not resulted in the hoped-for
behavior on the part of the child.
Second, punishing parents for acts of adolescent rebellion may
constitute a kind of retribution against those persons perceived as
2. See infra Part III (examining theories of parental control over children).
3. See infra Part III.A (examining the Parental Control approach to parenting).
4. See infra Part IV.A (discussing economic efficiency as a justification for parental
accountability).
5. See infra Part III.A-B (setting out and contrasting the Parental Control and Parental
Influence approaches to parenting).
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responsible for a generation that is less disciplined and seemingly more
out of control than prior generations. Assuming for the sake of
argument that today's youngsters are in fact worse behaved than their
predecessors, this is only a just result if the parents could have achieved
a different result by parenting differently. Looking for the threads of
agreement among the child-rearing authorities, we will find gradations
of parental guilt that might make the retributive purpose a legitimate
6
one.
Third, punishing the parents of errant children may serve as a
deterrent to recalcitrant children, their parents, or other parents who
might otherwise be too lenient with their own children. 7 As we will see,
threats of punishment or actual punishment directed at parents have no
8
demonstrable effect on the behavior of truly resistant children.
However, it does appear that at least some parents alter their childrearing behavior in response to direct threats of punishment.
There is no readily available method of ascertaining whether
unrelated parents, who might themselves be too lenient with
adolescents, will adjust their behavior in response to seeing other
parents punished. However, the notion of "deterrence by example" is
the most problematic of the deterrence theories. Interestingly, the
punished parent need not have had even the possibility of any real
control over his own child for this objective to be achieved. It is only
necessary that the observing parents think that if the offending parent
had acted differently, his child would be in control and punishment of
the parent would not have occurred. This is the most dangerous of the
justifications in the sense that the punished parent is being used to
motivate others, but the punishment may not be just in the sense that the
parent may have had neither actual control over the child nor the means
to obtain it.
This Article will examine how the notion of parental control over
children affects some types of legal decisions and will analyze whether
the expectation of parental control is a just basis for making law. In
discussing parental control, the emphasis will be on control of preadolescent and adolescent children; in other words, children within the

6. See infra Part IV.B (discussing retribution as a justification for holding parents
accountable).
7. See infra Part IV.C (discussing deterrence as a justification for parental accountability).
8. See infra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (discussing children who are naturally
inflexible and uncontrollable); infra Part IV (examining the justifications for and effectiveness of
holding parents accountable for the children's misbehavior).
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ages of eleven to eighteen. 9 In Part II, two types of situations are
scrutinized: cases in which rebellious children refuse to cooperate in
visitation arrangements after a parental divorce 1 ° and cases where
These
children are truants from mandatory school attendance. 11
situations will show an implicit expectation that parents can and should
enforce visitation and school attendance by their children. Part III of
the Article will evaluate this expectation of parental control in light of
current parenting literature. Part IV will analyze the possible policy
justifications for parental accountability in light of the previously
discussed parenting literature. Part IV also will use some of the cases
from Part II to illustrate the ramifications of some of the policies.
Finally, the Article concludes that while current evidence may justify a
presumption of parental control over and responsibility for the behavior
of older children, that presumption should be rebuttable because current
evidence also shows that even diligent parental efforts cannot achieve
complete control.

II.

PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT PARENTAL CONTROL IN THE LAW

A.

The Child Resisting Visitation

Cases dealing with visitation (or shared custody) after parental
divorces (and the statutes that apply to them), present a vivid illustration
of the struggle between a model that presumes parental control and a
model that presumes child autonomy. State statutes typically require
that both parents have reasonable access to their children, barring proof
of actual risk of harm to a child from contact with a parent. 12 The terms
of the visitation may be agreed to by the parents or imposed by the
family court. Both parents are expected to contribute to the financial
support of the child, and the "visiting" parent normally will be required
to pay monthly child support of a set amount. 13 Compliance with those
9. Hence, the term "children" as it is used in this Article will frequently refer to older
offspring, albeit offspring who have not yet reached the age of majority. Obviously, parents can
exercise some degree of control over babies and small children. In the contexts discussed here,
for example, a five-year-old could be picked up physically and delivered to a non-custodial parent
or to a school. Physical delivery is a different matter with an older, larger child. Hence, the
discussion of what other types of control a parent reasonably can be expected to have over older
children is warranted.
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing cases involving children refusing to comply with visitation
orders).
11. See infra Part II.B (examining decisions involving truancy).
12. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(4)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003). See generally
LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 807-08 (2d ed. 2000).

visitation is an extreme remedy rarely approved." Id. at 807.
13. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.25.

"Denial of
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terms is expected, although sometimes one or both parties will consent
to changes. However, what happens if a child fails to appear at an
appointed visitation time?
The following are typical facts: A child, most often age twelve to
seventeen, begins a patternof failing to appear for scheduled visitation
times. The visiting parent's efforts to contact the child and the custodial
parent are either ignored or met with explanations that the child refused
to go, the child does not want to see the visiting parent, or even that the
child no longer wishes to pursue a relationship with the visiting parent.
The visiting parent responds with understandable disappointment and
anger. The custodial parent at first may try to persuade the recalcitrant
child and, if that is not successful, may threaten consequences of one
sort or another. The reactions of custodial parents may vary from covert
encouragement of the rebellion to pleading, persuasion, or threats of
punishment to get the child to comply with ordered visitation. If visits
still are not forthcoming, some visiting parents resort to the self-help of
withholding support payments. This often results in a petition to the
court by the custodial parent. Other visiting parents eschew self-help
and immediately petition the court for relief, such as a suspension of
their payment obligations, due to a denial of visitation rights. Either
way, the parents end up back in family court, each likely to blame the
other for the interruption in visitation.
The approaches taken by various courts to the above scenario show
how beliefs and assumptions about parental control over the behavior of
minors influence the law governing parents and children. A survey of
relevant cases reveals that many, perhaps most, courts take the position
that parents can and should control the behavior of their minor children
in visitation situations. 14 The rest of this section takes an in-depth look
at representative cases where visitation was interrupted by a child's
refusal to cooperate and analyzes the courts' reasonings in those
decisions.
Courts that take the position that custodial parents can and should
force visitation in effect treat visitation failure as wrongdoing on the
part of the custodial parent. This approach presumes that the custodial
parent has control over the behavior of the child and that the parent is in
some sense responsible for the child's failure to visit.
Typical
allegations are that the custodial parent poisoned the relationship
between the child and the other parent, or that the parent encouraged or
allowed, through laxity, the failure to appear for visitation. Courts
14. See infra notes 15-109 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions holding
custodial parents responsible for their children's refusal to visit non-custodial parents).

608
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taking this approach tend to impose dire consequences on the parents
whose exercise of parental control is found lacking. Erring parents may
be held in contempt of court and may be fined or required to serve jail
time as a result.
Macintosh v. Macintosh15 provides one example of this type of case.
In that case, the court awarded custody of the two daughters to the
mother, granting the father regular visitation. 16 Eight years later, when
both girls were teenagers, the couple began what the lower court
characterized as a "tug of war" over the children. 17 The father intended
to take both girls to Switzerland during his allotted visitation time in the
summer of 2000, but after he purchased the tickets, the girls apparently
refused to go. 18 The father got an emergency court order, which
required the girls to accompany their father on the trip. 19 However, this
20
ploy angered the girls, who then even more adamantly refused to go.
In the end, neither child went, and the father filed a petition for
contempt. 2 1 The lower court found the mother in contempt, imposed a
fine, and sentenced her to two years in jail, which would22be suspended
if she and the children complied with the visitation order.
The mother appealed, asserting inter alia that "she could not force her
fifteen- and sixteen-year-old children to participate in visitation." 23 The
court rejected her claim, stating: "[W]e have rejected the notion that a
custodial parent may justify inaction simply because a child refuses to
cooperate with a visitation order." 24 The court added that it should not
25
be up to a child to decide whether scheduled visitation takes place.
The court also clarified the purpose of the jail sentence:
Although incarceration undoubtedly has a punitive component, [the
mother] may avoid incarceration if she ensures that [the father]
receives parenting time under the general visitation order. Thus, the
effect of imprisonment is to coerce [the mother] into assuring that [the
father] and his children maintain continuing contact with each other.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
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The trial court was not precluded from
ordering imprisonment as a
26

condition for compliance with its order.
The court's insistence on the mother's responsibility to take action to
ensure that the children comply with the visitation order, as well as its
view that incarceration would "coerce" the mother into ensuring that the
father maintain contact with his teenage daughters, reveals a belief that
the mother can control the behavior of her children if she makes an
effort. The burden of making sure that the father and the children
maintain a relationship with each other seems to be placed solely on the
mother. The court dismissed the claim that she could not make the
daughters carry out the visitation but offered no concrete advice as to
how someone might force an adolescent, who may well be adult-sized
27
and strong-willed, to comply.
Dual policy concerns are evident here.

The first is the policy of

encouraging continued contact with both parents as a means of
advancing the best interests of the child. The second is preserving the
integrity of family court orders. A sometimes-articulated concern is that
a parent who is hostile to an ex-spouse could conspire with a child or
clandestinely influence the child's attitudes and behavior without the
child's conscious acquiescence. 28 This could completely abnegate the
visiting parent's right to continue to have a relationship with the child.
26. Id. at 631-32.
27. Id. at 630.
28. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 146 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
The primary question before us, therefore, is whether the court below was correct
in directing the mother to deliver the child to its father for visitation .... [W]e feel that
the court has such power. If this were not true any child conspiring with the defendant
in a custody action could completely nullify the custody order of the court. Hearing
judges must take into consideration the feelings of all the parties and weigh carefully
the effect of forcing the children and parents to do what may be justly abhorrent to
them, but in the end the court's order cannot be voided solely because a child and
parent may join in a stubborn refusal to comply.
Visitation rights of a parent not in custody have long been a matter of concern to
the law of this Commonwealth. They must be carefully guarded for when parents are
separated and custody is placed in one of the parents, there exists a danger that the
parent having custody of the child may use his or her advantageous position to alienate
the other parent from the affections of the child. Were we to reverse the order of the
court below, we would provide an easy method for any person who has obtained the
custody of a child to nullify the visitation rights granted by the court. A court which
has awarded custody of a child can require the person to whom such custody has been
awarded to exert reasonable authority over such child to require it to obey the lawful
orders of a court.
Id.; see also Hoffer v. Hoffer, 447 A.2d 972, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (affirming a mother's
visitation schedule over the custodial father's objection that he was not allotted enough weekend
time with his son).
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Yet, while courts that subscribe to the view that parents must assert
control are quick to insist that custodial parents demand cooperation in
visitation, those courts are thin on details as to just how parents can
successfully assert their authority. 29 Some judicial opinions do little
30
more than order the custodial parent to get the children to comply.
How this is to be accomplished is not discussed. Rather, the courts tend
to describe what parental action is insufficient, such as where the parent
suggests that the child visit or makes ineffective attempts at disciplining
the child who fails to visit. 31 I could find no case where a court
expressly required a custodial parent to physically force an adolescent
to participate in visitation. There seems to be an implication in some of
these cases that if the custodial parent really meant business and
conveyed that to the child, then the child would comply. 32 Yet it is not
at all clear from the facts of these cases whether that would indeed be
the outcome.
For example, in Fernaldv. Fernald,3 3 a father appealed from a lower
court's denial of visitation rights with his children, aged thirteen,
fifteen, and nineteen. 34 The denial apparently was based on a fifteenminute interview with the children in which they "strongly indicated no
wish to visit with their father." 3 5 The appeals court overturned the
denial with respect to the thirteen- and fifteen-year-olds, noting that
under Pennsylvania law, a child's wish not to see a parent is not
controlling. 36 The court did not extend its ruling to the nineteen-yearold daughter who, the court noted, already was considered an adult for
most purposes. 37 The court held that the mother must exercise her
authority over the other two children and require them to visit their
38
father despite their reluctance to do so.

29. See, e.g., Fernald v. Fernald, 302 A.2d 470 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (discussed infra notes
33-40 and accompanying text).
30. Id. at 471.
31. See, e.g., Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (discussed infra notes
54-65 and accompanying text).
32. See id.; see also Rideout v. Rideout, 40 P.3d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (discussed infra
notes 41-51), affd, 77 P.3d 1174, 1175 (Wash. 2003); Fernald, 302 A.2d 470 (discussed infra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text).
33. Fernald, 302 A.2d at 470.
34. Id. at 470-71.
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id. at 471.
37. Id.
38. Id. ("The other two minor children, however, can be required to visit their father, despite
their desire not to do so, and the mother can be directed to exercise her parental authority over
them so as to require their compliance with the visitation order.").
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How the mother could enforce compliance is not specified, despite
the court's requirement that she do so. However, the clear implication
in the case is that she turned the children against their father and that
she must undo the damage. This can be inferred from the fact that the
court noted that the children's mother believed the father's lifestyle
threatened and violated her religious views relating to family life, and
that the court pointed out that the mother stressed her allegation that the
father had deserted her for another woman. 3 9 Later in the opinion, the
court further revealed its belief that the mother had alienated the
children from their father, noting that the mother interfered
with his
40
efforts to send birthday cards and make telephone calls.
The court never addressed the possibility that the adolescent children
may have formed a negative impression of their father and his role in
the divorce on their own and not because of their mother's bitterness. If
the children in fact developed a negative opinion of the father
independently, the mother may not find it easy or even possible to
demand compliance with visitation as the court required.
Rideout v. Rideout41 is another case in which the court found the
custodial parent's actions wanting. In that case, the court commissioner
found the mother in contempt for failing to deliver her daughter
Caroline, then aged twelve or thirteen, for court-ordered visitation with
her father. 42 The mother argued that she had not acted based on the bad
faith required by the Washington contempt statute "because Caroline
had refused to cooperate in the visitation and did not want to spend time
43
with her father."
On appeal, the mother argued that she did not act in bad faith in
failing to deliver Caroline for her scheduled visitation:
[The mother] admits that she did not deliver Caroline to [the father] on
July 27, 2000, as the court ordered. But she argues that she did not act
in bad faith. She contends that she tried to persuade Caroline to visit
39.

Id.

40. Id.
The record reveals in this case that the father did try to keep in touch with his children
via birthday cards and telephone calls but discontinued those efforts when they were
thwarted by the mother and rendered unsuccessful by her. The father, despite such
reaction on the part of the mother which she imparted to her children, has continued to
pay $20 per week for each of the three children even though the 19-year old daughter is
now emancipated.
Id.
41. Rideout v. Rideout, 40 P.3d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), afftd, 77 P.3d 1174 (Wash.
2003).
42. Id. at 1193.
43.

Id.
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[the father], but she would not go. She believes that forcing Caroline
to visit [the father] was impossible. She states in her brief, "[t]he very
upon an
concept that a primary parent is responsible to force visitation
44
unwilling teen is a violation of the very laws of nature."
Acknowledging that the question was one of first impression in
Washington, the court examined cases from other states before rejecting
the mother's appeal.4 5 The court held that it could only find that a
parent acted in bad faith when his or her child resisted a visitation order
if the evidence demonstrated that the parent "contributed to the child's
attitude or failed to make reasonable efforts to require the child to
comply." 4 6 The court held that here the mother both contributed to her
and failed to make reasonable efforts to
daughter's reluctance to visit
47
require her daughter to visit.
The court went on to describe a pattern of incidents in which the
mother made excuses for Caroline and was vague about her
whereabouts when the father attempted to pick her up.4 8 The mother
apparently did little more than offer "to allow [the father] to come over
and 'drag Caroline out."' 4 9 The court found this maternal behavior
wanting and emphasized that the mother had an obligation to ensure her
daughter complied with the parenting plan. 50 The court added:
"Caroline's repeated failures to visit with her father coupled with [the
mother's] proffered excuses and her bystander attitude are sufficient to
the course of events
conclude that [the mother] was subtly manipulating
51
to frustrate [the father's] visitation rights."
As already noted in the above discussion of Fernald, there is little
recognition in the cases of the possibility that an adolescent child might
have legitimate reasons for backing away from a relationship with a
visiting parent. In Lotz v. Lotz, which affirmed an order compelling a
thirteen-year-old girl to visit her father against her strong wishes, 52 only
the dissenting opinion defended the possibility that the girl's opposition
may have arisen from her own free and justified position. 53 The
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 146 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
Id. at 365 (Wright, J., dissenting).
I cannot go along with the majority in ordering this mother to force her thirteen year
old daughter to visit her father. The record discloses that the girl refuses to make the
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in these situations is stated clearly by the court
dilemma faced by courts
54
in Ex parte Rosser:
This dispute, of course, raises serious policy and practical
considerations. On the one hand, the policy of this state is to
encourage a close and continuing relationship between a child and
each parent by frequent periods of possession. That policy can be
achieved only to the extent the courts have effective means to enforce
visitation, such as by contempt. On the other hand, to hold a parent in
contempt for his child's unwillingness to comply with visitation would
suggest that the parent must either forcibly compel the child to
comply, or simply be held accountable for the child's refusal to do
so.

55

Ex parte Rosser involved a father who filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus after he was found in contempt for failure to comply with
a visitation order, and the court entered an order for capias for his
arrest. 56 The court found part of the contempt order (as well, as the
capias, which relied upon that portion of the order) void, but it upheld
that portion of the contempt order finding that the father had the ability
to comply with the order but nonetheless failed to do so. 57 The father
had the burden of proving involuntary inability to comply, and the court
outlined what he would have had to show in order to carry that burden:
Within the spectrum of visitation disputes, there may be instances in
which: (1) a parent actively discourages or impedes visitation; (2) a
parent passively fails to insist that a child comply with visitation; or
(3) a parent is legitimately unable to compel a child to comply with
visitation. We believe the defense of involuntary ability to comply
58
applies only to the third alternative, and not the first two.
The court's reiteration of the facts of the case show just how hard it
can be for a parent to prove legitimate inability to force a child to
comply.5 9 The daughter, who was seventeen at the time of the hearing,
had a strained relationship with her mother and flatly refused to go on
visits voluntarily because the father has inflicted serious physical injuries upon her, and
she fears and dislikes him. While I fully agree that it is against public policy to destroy
or limit the relationship of parent and child, and that a parent should not be denied the
right of visitation, the instant order does not provide for visitation of the child by the
father. On the contrary, it requires the mother to compel visitation of the father by the
child.
Id.
54. Exparte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
55. Id. at 385 n.7 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 384.
57. Id. at 386-87.
58. Id. at 386.
59. Id. at 383-84.
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summer visitation with her. 60 Testifying as to her refusal, the daughter
stated:
I think that even if you force me to, you know, to physically drag
me, I just don't believe my dad would do that. I just-I mean, he
couldn't do it. He can't drag me to do anything. He made it very
clear that there would be consequences if I didn't go and I think that
shows how persistent I am and not just someone who will [be forced]
to visit my mother and to have a relationship with my mother....
He told me I had to go. He said that he would drag me into the car
and I said that6 1I would [go] run away to a friend's if he forced me to
[go] visit her.
In terms of efforts to encourage his daughter's compliance with the
visitation order, the father reportedly talked with her, encouraged her to
visit, grounded her, and took her car away for a week because she
refused. 62 He told her that he might be held in contempt if she refused
to go. The daughter apologized but told him that she still refused to
go. 6 3 Nonetheless, the lower court found that the father had the ability
64
to comply with the visitation order but failed to do so.
Once again, neither the lower court nor the appellate court spelled out
just what further action would be required of the father. Although the
appellate court conceded that it saw no evidence that the father sought
to impede or discourage visitation, the court upheld the lower court's
conclusion, deferring to the trial court's judgment on the credibility of
65
the witnesses.
Why did the trial court find the claim of impossibility unbelievable?
The simple explanation may be that witness demeanor, tone of voice, or
facial expression led the court to conclude that the explanations were
not truthful. However, the trial court also may have subscribed to the
view that the custodial parent can and should control the behavior of a
minor child. If that is the premise, then failure to comply will be

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 385-86. The court stated:
[The father's] and Julie's testimony were to the effect that he tried to persuade her to
visit her mother, but because she refused, he was unable to do so.
However, [the father] and Julie were interested witnesses, and their testimony
could not be readily contradicted if untrue. Thus, the trial court was not bound by this
testimony if it disbelieved it, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court on that determination.
Id. at 386.
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viewed as evidence of faulty parenting, but the court would not
generally construe it as evidence that the parent could not force
compliance by the child.
In a case with similar facts, Hancock v. Hancock,6 6 the appellate
court overturned a portion of a contempt order based on a finding that
the mother willfully violated the terms of a consent judgment by failing
to require her son Andrew to visit his father. 67 In that case, Andrew
not
apparently loved his father and wanted contact with him but did
68
wish to spend time with his father's second wife and her children.
The appeals court was sympathetic to the mother's claim that the
child's failure to appear for visitation was not the result of any
resistance to visitation or willfulness on the mother's part. 69 The court
noted that the mother had done everything, except use physical force or
threats of punishment, to make the child visit his father, including
getting the child ready to go, encouraging him to go, and telling him he
had to go. 70 The court found that mere failure by the mother to use
physical force on the boy, absent any evidence that7 1she encouraged his
resistance to visitation, did not amount to contempt.
Despite overturning the visitation-based portion of the contempt
order, the appellate court did not let this mother completely off the
hook.7 2 The court described the father's frustration as "understandable"
and held that where a custodial parent has taken no action to force a

66. Hancock v. Hancock, 471 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
67.

Id. at 422.

68. Id. at 419. The court also noted:
The child also testified on cross-examination that he did not visit with his father
because he "didn't feel comfortable" with defendant's wife or at defendant's house,
that defendant's wife had called him "a spoiled brat," and that the beds at defendant's
house were "uncomfortable." Plaintiffs daughter testified she had never heard her
mother discourage the child from visiting his father and had instead always encouraged
him to go. She said her brother refused to go because he "hated it down there" at his
father's home and because the child "hated" defendant's wife's son. Defendant
testified he thought plaintiff should "at least make" the child go for his visitation in the
same way she made the child attend school.
Id.

69. Id. at 419-20.
70. Id.
71.

Id.

While perhaps the plaintiff could have used some method to physically force the child
to visit his father, even if she improperly did not force the visitation, her actions do not
rise to a willful contempt of the consent judgment.... We find no evidence that
plaintiff willfully refused to allow the child to visit with the defendant.
Id.
72. Id. at 420.
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child to visit, the non-custodial parent should ask the court to modify
73
the visitation order to compel visitation.
This confusing advice is difficult to apply. Is the court suggesting
that parents should be ordered to physically force a child to visit? This
would seem to be consistent with some of the cases above, such as
Fernald and Rosser, in which the custodial parents were held in
contempt despite the fact that they evidently had done everything but
physically force the child to visit. 74 The father's testimony in Hancock,
that the mother "should 'at least make' the child go for his visitation in
the same way she made the child attend school, 7 5 gives some insight
into the expectation of parental authority present here. The statement
implies a presumption that the child's attendance at school is the result
of an appropriate and successful assertion of parental authority. So too,
the reasoning goes, the mother should compel attendance at visitation.
Yet, this line of reasoning does not admit the possibility that the child
might actually want to attend school, or at least is not unwilling to do
SO.
Moreover, it is difficult to find any cases on appeal that discuss the
remedy of an order compelling visitation. In Mintz v. Mintz, which was
cited by the court in Hancock, the court reversed an order that provided
for the incarceration of the custodial parent, the mother, if the father
orally reported to the sheriff that the mother had failed to comply with
the visitation order. 76 The reversal was due to the appellate court's
77
conclusion that the order violated the mother's due process rights.
The court's discussion of the order to compel visitation appeared in this
larger context:
Although improperly attempted in the present case, a trial judge has
the power to make an order forcing a child to visit the non-custodial
parent, but only when the circumstances are so compelling and only
after he has done the following: afforded to the parties a hearing in
73.

Id. (citing Mintz v. Mintz, 307 S.E.2d 391, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)). The court stated:
Defendant's frustration over not being able to have visitation with his child is certainly
understandable. Where, as here, the custodial parent does not prevent visitation but
takes no action to force visitation when the child refuses to go, the proper method is for
the non-custodial parent to ask the court to modify the order to compel visitation. "[A]
trial judge has the power to make an order forcing a child to visit the non-custodial
parent."

Id.
74. See generally supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Fernald
decision); supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing Rosser).
75. See supra note 68 (quoting Hancock v. Hancock, 471 S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. Ct. App.

1996)).
76. Mintz v. Mintz, 307 S.E.2d 391, 393-94 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
77. Id. at 394.
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accordance with due process; created a proper court order based on
findings of fact and conclusions of law determined by the judge to
justify and support the order; and made findings that include at a
minimum that the drastic action of incarceration of a parent is
reasonably necessary for the promotion
and protection of the best
78
interest and welfare of the child.
It seems from this and other language in the case that a court's
appropriate response to a failure to comply with an order forcing a child
to visit would be to hold the custodial parent in contempt and possibly
incarcerate her. Since this is the usual penalty for violation of visitation
orders, 79 the dispute here appears to be mostly about process and
procedure rather than about family law principles.
Oddly enough, In re Custody of Stancil,80 which the Mintz court cites
as general support for its conclusion, does not involve a childish refusal
to visit, or even a dispute between parents; it involved an award of
custody to a child's grandmother after the death of his father, the
custodial parent. 8 1 The appellate court upheld the custody order against
the mother's appeal but found that the lower court erred in entering a
visitation order that gave the grandmother complete discretion as to
whether, when, and how the mother could visit the child.82 The
relevance of this case to a situation where a child balks at visitation is
somewhat obscure. However, there is much discussion in Stancil of the
importance of a non-custodial parent's right to visit, and the folly of
allowing visitation by the non-custodial parent to be subject to the
invitation, consent, or convenience of the custodial parent. 83 Since the
custodial parent often bears the blame for a child's refusal to visit, the
court may have been persuaded to use its power to force the custodial
parent here to facilitate visitation.
Ironically, while courts like those cited above suggest that physical
force may be necessary to assure compliance with a visitation order,
many courts will not allow the less violent method of withholding child
support as a method to encourage compliance. Often these issues arise
in the context of a petition to release a non-custodial parent from the
78. Id. (citing In re Custody of Stancil, 179 S.E.2d 844 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971)).
79. See, e.g., HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 320 (3d ed. 1995). Contempt
is the usual penalty for violation of visitation orders, although courts occasionally turn over
custody to the other parent. Id.
80. In re Custody of Stancil, 179 S.E.2d 844 (N.C..Ct. App. 1971).
81. Id. at 845-46.
82. Id. at 849-50. The unusual decision to award custody to someone other than a living
parent was based on the fact that the mother had a history of mental illness, and had had only
supervised visitation with the child prior to the father's death. Id. at 846-47.
83. Id. at 848.
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obligation of paying child support. 84 A typical fact scenario involves an
adolescent child who has consistently failed to appear for court-ordered
visitation, a custodial parent who is not forcing an appearance, and a
fed-up payor parent who believes he should no longer have to support a
child who wants nothing more to do with him.
As a preliminary matter, it is interesting to consider the supportwithholding behavior of the payor. Withholding support could be
intended to control the behavior of the custodial parent, and to get her to
force the child to visit. After all, any financial burden resulting from
non-payment of support is likely to be borne by the custodial parent,
who will have to come up with another means of providing what the
child needs. Or, the non-payment may be intended to punish the child,
who at some point will have to manage with fewer resources once the
support payments cease. If the motivation is the latter one, it implicitly
presumes (at least unconsciously) that the child has some control over
the visitation behavior, or over the perceived choice to "side with" the
custodial parent. Whatever the intent of the payor, courts generally are
reluctant to suspend child support payment obligations because of
public policy concerns: the welfare of the child and the potential burden
to society if a child's parents do not financially support her.
A case in point is Macaluso v. Macaluso.85 There, in a dispute over
payment of child support and enforcement of the father's visitation
rights, the trial court entered a stipulated judgment, which contained a
provision that made future child support payments contingent upon the
daughter's compliance with the father's visitation rights. 86 The
daughter was sixteen at the time. The agreement stood for eight days
before the mother filed an action for contempt and past due child
support. 87 The mother alleged that the father and his new wife treated
the daughter badly and made it "impossible for her to complete the
specified period of visitation." 88 The mother "further alleged that [the
father] was using this as a pretext for wrongfully refusing to pay child
support, and accordingly, she requested that past due child support be
89
made executory."
Following a hearing in which it was determined that the daughter had
not complied with the visitation requirements of the stipulated
84. See infra notes 85-109 and accompanying text (discussing cases concerning the release of
non-custodial parents from paying child support).
85. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 509 So. 2d 201 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Id. at 202.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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judgment, the mother's request was denied. 90 She appealed, and the
court held that the section of the judgment that made child support
contingent on compliance with the visitation term was "an absolute
nullity." 9 1 The court found that this sort of provision was void as
against the public policy of ensuring that all children receive the support
they need for maintenance and upbringing. 92 The court held that "[a]
parent's duty of support arises entirely independent of any issue of
visitation privileges, merely by virtue of the child's paternity." 93 The
court added that such a provision had practical limitations and also
94
could be voided because it was not in the daughter's best interest.
It is unclear whether the father in Macaluso was attempting to
motivate (or punish) the mother or the child through his nonpayment.
The court does not address who is responsible for the failure of
visitation but only establishes the principle that support and visitation
are separate legal issues.
In a 1985 Wyoming case, Broyles v. Broyles, the Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed portions of a trial court order that released a father from
further child support obligations on the ground that the daughter, who
was a senior in high school, refused to visit with him. 95 Citing authority
from many jurisdictions, the court held:
[T]he denial of visitation rights by either the custodial parent or the
child does not constitute a change in circumstances justifying the
reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's support
obligation. A child's need for support and a parent's ability to pay are
not related to questions concerning visitation. The welfare of the child
is a primary concern, and the duty of a noncustodial parent to support
his or her child cannot
depend on that parent's opportunity to exercise
96
visitation rights.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cardine expressed his concern that
the majority opinion held that so long as the daughter remained
unemancipated, the father's child support obligation continued without
regard to any other consideration. 97 In Justice Cardine's view, the
better rule would be to require a non-custodial parent to continue child
90. Id.
91. Id. at 203.
92. Id. at 202.
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id.
95. Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1128-29 (Wyo. 1985).
96. Id. at 1128. Note that the court's choice of words, "the denial of visitation rights by
either" (emphasis added), stresses that the court is not opining on who is responsible for the
visitation breakdown.
97. Id. at 1129 (Cardine, J., concurring).
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support unless "the custodial parent is capable of providing support for
the unemancipated minor child, and... the custodial parent is at fault or
at least substantially involved in the unemancipated minor's refusal to
98
afford visitation rights to the non-custodial parent."
Other cases are in accord. For example, in Carroll v. Carroll,9 9 the
appeals court reversed a lower court judgment suspending a father's
child support obligation because his sixteen-year-old son refused to
visit. The court noted that while the situation was almost impossible
from the trial court's perspective, it would reverse the portion of the
judgment that suspended the support obligation, holding that a child's
refusal to visit would not cancel a non-custodial parent's obligation of
10 0
child support.
Both the concurrence in Broyles and the opinion in Carrollimply that
those courts believed that the custodial parent may be responsible for
visitation failure at least some of the time. In such cases, courts view
reducing the child support payments of the non-custodial parent as a
possibly fair penalty for the custodial parent's wrongful actions.
However, these courts are unwilling to presume that the custodial parent
is at fault, at least in the context of child support obligations. It is
unclear from the opinions whether this represents a rejection of the
expectation of parental control or a particular solicitude for the burdens
of society if child support payments are not made.
Another judicial approach is to treat children as individuals acting out
of their own free will. This approach does not make the custodial
parent accountable for the child's behavior. Courts taking this approach
may impose consequences on the children themselves or may
emphasize persuasion only and not impose overt consequences on
0
anybody.' '

98. Id. at 1130 (Cardine, J., concurring).
99. Carroll v. Carroll, 593 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
100. Id. The court further stated, "[W]e are unwilling to say that conduct by a child, not
shown to be orchestrated by one of the parents, should relieve a parent of his or her duty to
support the child. This seems to punish only the other parent's ability to pay for that child's
needs." Id. at 1133.
101. A variation of the free will approach is taken by some courts that will discontinue a
support obligation where it is shown that a child is emancipated. The doctrine of constructive
emancipation recognizes the free will of employed children who are financially independent from
their parents; however, actions other than paid employment can result in a court treating a child as
emancipated for child support purposes. See, e.g., Cohen v. Schnepf, 454 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786-87
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (releasing a father from support of an eighteen-year-old son who changed
his name to that of his stepfather and denying payment of the son's college expenses). See
generally Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against Including
Post-majority EducationalExpenses in Court-orderedChild Support, 34 IND. L. REv. 343, 347-
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I could find few cases in this category, but one of the rare examples
of this approach is set out in the concurring opinion in Broyles
discussed above. 10 2 In this case, the concurring justice provided a
sympathetic analysis of the daughter's refusal to visit, stating:
The rights of the parent and the child must coexist. If the child, of his
own volition, determines not to visit the noncustodial parent, it seems
that the child may have a right to those feelings. Neither the child nor
the custodial parent should be punished for that choice. As the
Michigan Court of Appeals said in Henshaw v. Henshaw... :
Affection is bestowed, not bought. Family relations cannot be
regulated by the clock. Obviously, any coerced companionship
the defendant might compel by a cutoff of child support would be
utterly devoid of the sentiments of filial love and respect whose
encouragement furnished
the only admissible ground for visitation
10 3
in the first place.
The concurring justice went on to note that the seventeen-year-old
daughter in question clearly was solely responsible for her own refusal
to visit. 10 The girl testified that she was afraid of her father because he
had abused her mother, and that she did not want to visit her father
because he failed to spend time with her while her parents were married
105
and the parties were living together.
In the Henshaw case cited by the court above, the court held that
"support payments may not be used as a weapon to force a child's
visitation." 10 6 The court was uncommonly sympathetic to a thirteenyear-old girl who refused to visit her father because, as she testified,
they had no interests in common, and her father sometimes embarrassed
or criticized her. 10 7 The court stated:
It is clear to us that it is the defendant-father who must convince his
daughter that she should visit him. We cannot prescribe how that
should be accomplished because each case of this kind presents a new
situation. The child's likes and dislikes, her activities, her age and
08
friends are all variables which weigh heavily in matters of this type. 1

49 (2001) (stating that college expenses typically are not required as child support absent special

circumstances).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. Broyles reversed portions of a trial court
order that had released a father from child support obligations because his teenage daughter
refused to visit him. Broyles, 711 P.2d at 1128-29.
103. Broyles, 711 P.2d at 1130 (Cardine, J., concurring).
104. Id. (Cardine, J., concurring).

105. Id. (Cardine, J., concurring).
106.
107.

Henshaw v. Henshaw, 268 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 290-91.

108. Id. at 290.
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estrangement from their children as their children approach
adolescence, especially in homes broken by divorce, the fact that the
daughter here unfortunately wanted to distance herself "hardly justifies
calling on the retributive power of the state." 10 9
B. The Truant Child
Truancy provides another example of a situation where a child's
failure to follow an established rule (mandatory school attendance) can

be perceived either as a failure of appropriate parental control or as a
free act of rebellion by the child. While society sometimes has treated
truancy lightly in the past, 110 the past decade has seen a movement
toward cracking down on truancy, which increasingly is viewed as a

harbinger of more serious criminal misbehavior in the future.11 1 This
crackdown often takes the form of punishing parents whose children are

truant.
Punishment of parents for a child's truancy from school is based on
the premise that it is a parental responsibility to assure that children
attend school and that conscientious parents will consistently do so.
According to one district educator in Fort Worth, Texas, "It's a parent's
responsibility, just like feeding and clothing them. The way I look at it,
not sending a child to school is another form of neglect."' 112 A domestic

relations and juvenile court judge in Franklin County, Ohio agreed:
"There is no greater benefit you can give your child than an education.

109. ld. at 291.
110. See, e.g., FERRIS BUELLER'S DAY OFF (Paramount Pictures 1986). At one point,
Matthew Broderick's character Ferris asks: "How can I possibly be expected to handle school on
a day like this?" James Alan Fox & Jack Levin, Opinion, Playing Hooky, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
2, 2000, at 45A (quoting Ferris in Ferris Bueller's Day Off and arguing that "[hiolding parents
legally responsible for their children's chronic absenteeism sounds better than it is"), availableat
2000 WL 6662612.
111. See Janet E. Jackson, Letter to the Editor, Truancy Is the FirstStep Down a Long, Dark
Road, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 2001, at 14A ("High-school dropouts ... are 2 1/2 times
more likely to be on welfare than high-school graduates."), availableat 2001 WL 17867322; Joe
Williams, Educators Say They Can't Control Many of Students' Obstacles, 'Suitcase Full of
Problems' Complicates District's Effort to Cut Truancy, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Mar. 1,
1998, at 10 ("Educators and police also agree that there is a relationship between truancy and
crime. Just about all of the juveniles charged with serious and violent crimes tend to have truancy
problems in their backgrounds, said Sue Jaskulski, who handles truancy cases in the Milwaukee
County district attorney's office."), availableat 1998 WL 6303802.
112. Nancy Calaway, Judging Truancy; New Fort Worth Court Aims To Curb Absences with
Zero-toleranceMessage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at 15A,available at LEXIS,
News Library, Major Newspapers File.
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If parents, by their inaction, fail to send their child to school, that to me,
1
is criminal." 13
Parental responsibility for truancy may be premised on parental
inaction, as shown by the preceding comments. However, some believe
that parents are more actively responsible for their children's failure to
attend school, enabling truancy by providing written excuses or having
older children baby-sit younger siblings during school hours. 1 14 Some
parents, dropouts themselves, apparently do not have the inclination to
require school attendance of their own children. "Some of these kids
are children of children who were pregnant at [fifteen]. They don't
think there's anything wrong with [truancy] because they stopped going
[to school] in the eighth grade, according to one school attendance
clerk."' 15
The price of this parental responsibility can be high. Laws and
ordinances passed by states, counties, school districts, and
municipalities impose combinations of fines, prison sentences, and
community service on parents and sometimes on their errant children as
well. A January 2000 editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times catalogued
some examples:
In February, when their children failed to show up for class, six
mothers from Downstate Springfield were threatened with 30 days in
jail. Last May, a grand jury in Brewton, Ala., indicted the 10 parents
of truant teenagers on charges punishable by three months behind
bars. And the parents of 67 out-of-school children in Detroit face
16
prospects of being incarcerated for up to 90 days. 1
Further, some states link welfare payments to school attendance,
withholding the payments from the students or their parents if the
students are truant.117 Other communities impose hefty fines of up to

113. Editorial, Juvenile Truancy ParentsShould Be Responsible, Too, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Aug. 16, 1999, at 6A (quoting Judge Yvette McGee Brown of Franklin County, Ohio, Domestic
Relations and Juvenile Courts), available at 1999 WL 22716837.
114. Peter Finn, PilotProgram Would Target School Truancy, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1997, at
Voi (quoting James Dedes, director of probation services, Fairfax County, Virginia), available at
1997 WL 10009404.
115. Calaway, supra note 112.
116. Fox& Levin, supra note 110.
117. See, e.g., Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rowland Seeks To Cut Welfare for Parents of Truant
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at BI, availableat LEXIS, News Library, New York Times
File. Rabinovitz reported that a study done by the Institute for Research in Poverty found that, as
of 1996,
34 states have received Federal permission to link welfare benefits to school
performance. These programs vary widely: while Connecticut intends to focus on the
parents of truant children, others are aimed at teen-aged parents or dropouts. At least
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$1000 or more on the parents. 118 Another favored penalty is the
119
imposition of community service obligations on parents.
Additionally, parents may face threats of multiple penalties.
There is a paucity of reported cases in which parents appeal these
penalties, possibly because of the comparatively low cost of the fines
relative to the cost of litigation, or possibly because the penalties are
threatened more often than they are imposed. 120 They may actually
have the desired deterrent effect. But are they good public policy?
There is the very reasonable question of whether, in fact, parents can
completely control the behavior of children, particularly teenagers.
Judge Yvette McGee Brown, a county juvenile court judge in Ohio,
said, "I don't expect a 120-pound woman to be able to get her 6-foot-2
son off to school if her son doesn't want to go." 12 1 She suggested "that
in such cases, the weight of the law is brought to bear against the teenager."' 12 2 Not everyone agrees that it is fair to penalize the parents,
12 3
rather than the teenagers, in the first place.

one program gives welfare recipients a bonus if they attend school and get good
grades.
Id.
118. See, e.g., Charles Stanley, ParentalLiability Code Gets Tougher, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28,
1996, at 3 (Metro Southwest ed.) (describing the 1996 decision of Richton Park, Illinois to boost
the range of possible truancy fines against the parents to $50 to $750), available at 1996 WL
2703103. See also James Bradshaw & Kevin Kidder, Governor To Sign Truancy Measure
Pressure on Parents, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 2, 2000, at IA, available at 2000 WL
21727491, which describes Ohio's SMART (Student Mediation and Assistance to Reduce
Truancy) program and notes that "in extreme cases [SMART] can fine parents of truants up to
$1,000 or sentence them to up to a year in jail under the first-degree misdemeanor of
'contributing to the nonsupport of a minor."' This approach has not been confined to the United
States. In 1998 The Independent of London reported that a British couple had been fined £1000
for failing to ensure that their truant fifteen-year-old son attended school. Record Fines After
Truancy, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), May 28, 1998, available at LEXIS, News File, Major
Newspapers File.
119. See, e.g., Stanley, supra note 118. Richton Park, Illinois requires up to 160 hours of
community service from parents of truants. Id.
120. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 124 (noting a police chief's experience that the
threat of a penalty appeared to be an effective deterrent).
121. Bradshaw & Kidder, supra note 118.
122. Id.
123. Fox & Levin, supra note 110.
Holding parents legally responsible for their children's chronic absenteeism sounds
better than it is. First, such laws send the wrong message to wayward youngsters who
are all too eager to escape the blame for their misconduct. By aiming the legal
sanctions at Mom and Dad, we teach children that they need not feel personally
responsible for their truancy-that only their parents need to change, not them. Even
worse, parental responsibility laws may backfire by persuading more parents to
distance themselves from their difficult youngsters rather than face the possibility--if
they fail-of being fined or spending time behind bars. Why take the risk yourself
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Proponents of punitive measures against parents argue in response
that the threat of sanctions provides a valuable incentive to parents and
wayward children alike. One suburban police chief told newspaper
reporters that while the police had not cited many parents, "it's effective
as a threat. When they receive a notice, parents tend to get angry. They
tell their kids: 'You're going to get us in trouble. Straighten up your
act."' 124 A Columbus, Ohio middle school student told the same
125
reporters, "I sure wouldn't skip-you care about your parents."'
Other kids were not so sure. One nineteen-year-old high school
graduate stated, "Those kids are going to do anything, whether there's a
126
law or not."
Just like the issue of recalcitrant children resisting court-ordered
visitation, the issue of child truancy raises the question of whether every
parent can control every child. Part III will examine books on parenting
pre-adolescent and adolescent children and also will address the
question of whether parents really have complete control over their
offspring.
III. EVALUATING THE EXPECTATION OF PARENTAL CONTROL

Our culture, like our legal system, revolves around a model in which
children remain children, for most purposes, until they are eighteen
years of age. This is also the case in many cultures much different from
our own. 127 Why it is so is the subject of much scholarly debate. Some
anthropologists suggest that human beings have a long childhood,
compared to other species, because their larger brains require a longer
period of learning. 128 Other researchers suggest that childhood is
129
protracted because humans have a comparatively longer lifespan.
Therefore, slow growth and postponement of reproduction make sense

when you can let the state take over if you're having problems with your child? This
may mean less diligent parenting, not more.
Id.
124. Bradshaw & Kidder, supra note 118.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Natalie Angier, Why Childhood Lasts, and Lasts and Lasts, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at
Dl (citing studies on the island of Mer, near Australia, where children could not compete with
adult women in the work of collecting shellfish, even though the children were proficient at
fishing), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Time File.
128. Id. (citing the work of Dr. Hillford S. Kaplan of the University of New Mexico, who
argues that "human styles of hunting and gathering are often quite complex compared with the
foraging strategies of other creatures, and thus require long periods of learning, practice, and
apprenticeship").
129. Id.
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"because the more one invests in physical development early on, the
higher one's reproductive success and quality of offspring in
adulthood." 130 Another advantage of a protracted childhood may be
that children are perceived as less threatening by adult protectors, who
are in their prime. 131
Whatever the physical or sociological motivations for protecting
smaller children, however, the reasons become less clear as children
advance through adolescence. Adolescents may well have reached
adult size and strength, they are likely capable of bearing and begetting
children, and they may have adult cognitive capacity, if not adult levels
of education and experience. Thus, it might not make sense to presume
that parents are capable of controlling adolescent children.
Experience and readily accessible parenting literature do not
necessarily justify popular or judicial presumptions that parents can and
should control the behavior of their adolescent and pre-adolescent
children. Look in the parenting section of any local library or bookstore
and you will find literally hundreds of books about the relationship
between parents and their children. 132 This section will discuss
information in several of these books, representing a range of theories
on parents and adolescents. My informal survey of these books reveals
that the authors are in agreement about some points, but after that, they
can be divided into groups according to how much control they believe
parents of adolescents have over their children. The authors also differ
somewhat about whether full-scale adolescent rebellion is a normal part
of the maturation process.
As a starting point, the sources agree that adolescence is known to be
a period in which children work on the psychological task of achieving
independence from their parents. 133 A second point of agreement is that
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. This Part discusses information in several of these books, representing a range of theories
on parents and adolescents. The books discussed were selected not quite at random; those
selected have authors who have some documented experience in research or in hands-on work
with adolescents and their parents, and most have credible academic credentials as well. For the
most part, I will not address tomes by persons whose only claim to fame is that they are
disgruntled about the behavior of the modem teenager. For example, see FRED G. GOSMAN,
SPOILED RoTrEN (1992), where the book jacket states, "The author, neither a psychiatrist nor a
cultural theorist, is a plainspoken Midwestern father."
133.

ELIZABETH BERGER, RAISING CHILDREN WITH CHARACTER 175 (1999)

[I]t is the essence of adolescence to need to embrace some risks. This is necessary for
the adolescent to take the biggest risk of all: to take his life in his own hands, no longer
protected by the parent, and begin to make his way in the world. This leads every
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some children are temperamentally difficult and therefore much more
difficult to parent. According to one source, a child can be classified on
a spectrum ranging from "basically easy but with some difficult
features" all the way to "impossible, a 'mother-killer,"' depending on
134
how many difficult temperamental traits that child has.
Yet, there is no absolute agreement among the experts about whether
parents can control the behavior of their adolescent children.
Examining these resources reveals that they divide into three main
categories.
The Parental Control approach emphasizes parental
authority, backed up with physical force if necessary. 135 The Parental
Influence approach maintains that while a parent can influence his or
her child's behavior, only the child truly controls it. 136
The
Societal/Peer Influence group focuses on the diminishment of parental
influence resulting from social messages (on television, in movies, etc.)
and peer group pressures and argues that parents have virtually no
1 37
control over what their pre-adolescent and adolescent children do.
We will examine each of these approaches in turn; however, it should
be noted at the outset that it is far easier to find theorists in the Parental
Influence camp. Proponents of Parental Control and Societal/Peer
Influence are much rarer.
A. The ParentalControl Approach
I could find no expert who claims that parents can and should control
every aspect of their children's behavior all of the time. However, in
Parent in Control, author Gregory Bodenhamer approaches that
view. 138 He argues that all children, no matter how temperamentally
ordinary adolescent to do things from time to time that his particular parents would not
choose to do because he is leading his own life and not theirs.
Id.
134.

STANLEY TURECKI & LESLIE TONNER, THE DIFFICULT CHILD 15 (1985).

Turecki and

Tonner evaluate the difficulty of a child's temperament by assessing nine temperamental traits:
activity level, distractibility, negative persistence, adaptability, approach/withdrawal, intensity,
regularity, sensory threshold, and mood. Id. at 14. Another author who deals with difficult
children emphasizes that these difficult temperamental traits continue through adolescence, but
notes that they are viewed with less tolerance after infancy. See Ross W. GREENE, THE
EXPLOSIVE CHILD 27 (2d ed. 2001).
135. See infra Part III.A (examining the Parental Control theory of parenting).
136. See infra Part III.B (examining the Parental Influence approach to parenting). Recently, I
was discussing the topic of this Article with some colleagues. All are parents, with children
ranging in age from four to twenty. All, even the parent of the four-year-old, were incredulous
that any parent could be so delusional as to believe he or she was actually controllinga child. As
will become clear, child-raising authors are somewhat more nuanced in their conclusions about
this issue.
137. See infra Part III.C (exploring the Societal/Peer Influence approach to parenting).
138. See generally GREGORY BODENHAMER, PARENT IN CONTROL (1995).
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difficult, can be forced to follow rules at home and school. 139
Bodenhamer writes, "Children's behavioral templates can be structured
with good character traits, good habits, and positive attitudes by using
the three elements within the ethological milieu that structure children's
behavior:
rule-based discipline, supervision, and emotional
attachment."140 Although Bodenhamer clearly presents these principles
as applicable to all children and adolescents, as a former probation
officer and current consultant and trainer for schools, parents, and
agencies, he focuses on children who are temperamentally difficult and
behaviorally out of control. 14 1 These are not mildly sassy teenagers;
Bodenhamer's subjects are failing or truant from school, verbally or
physically aggressive at home, and sometimes even engaging in
drinking, drugs, running away, and petty crime.
Nonetheless,
1 42
Bodenhamer insists that their parents can control their behavior.
Bodenhamer's book presents a detailed plan and many examples of how
this parental control should be established and maintained.
According to Bodenhamer, the first element of the program is
discipline, which "consists of three elements: clearly defined and stated
rules; follow-through and monitoring to make the rules mandatory; and
consistency."' 14 3 Follow-through involves adult monitoring that ranges
from minimum supervision to following the child and even physically
forcing or directing his actions. Examples of physical force would
include holding a child's hand and forcing her to write part of a
homework assignment or physically removing a sleeping teenager from
bed when it is time to get up for school. 144
The second element of Bodenhamer's program is supervision, and he
takes a decidedly hands-on approach there too. Bodenhamer defines
"supervision" as "consistently knowing and approving of what your
children are doing, where they are, and, most important, who [sic] they
are with." 145 Of course, most parents would opt for the honor system
here, but Bodenhamer is addressing parents whose children have
146
already lied to and manipulated them.
139. Id. at 37.
140. Id.
141. Id.at 42.
142. Id. at 14-15.
143. Id. at 38.
144. Id. at 38-39
145. Id. at 40.
146. Id. at 42. If a parent cannot trust a child, Bodenhamer suggests not letting the child out
of the house without the parent or a responsible adult. Id. If the child sneaks out when not
properly monitored, he suggests the parent employ security methods such as locking windows
and doors and installing an inexpensive alarm system. Id.
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The third element is emotional attachment. Bodenhamer believes
that unless parents can bond with their children, the children will
withdraw or misbehave. 14 7 He recommends positive shared activities
14 8
and verbal and physical expressions of affection.
Other advice in the book indicates that Bodenhamer maintains that
any parent who is truly determined and willing to do what it takes can
bring a child under control. 149 Even physical violence against a parent
is seen as controllable:
If you are a parent with no other resource or assistance, and you have
a violent teenager-one who smacks you around, slugs you, kicks
you, throws you against the wall or down on the floor-it is
imperative that you learn to defend yourself. Enroll in a self-defense
class or, better yet, take private lessons from a self-defense instructor
in pins, holds, and restraints. You don't need a black belt in one of the
martial arts to protect yourself. And you clearly don't want to learn to
maim or disable your violent child. Instead, you need to be trained by
a qualified self-defense instructor to do the basic pins, holds, and
restraints that police officers, psychiatric hospital staff, and juvenile
hall counselors use to protect themselves and the violent children with
whom they have to work. With consistent practice you can learn how
to put violent children on the floor and keep them there until they have
calmed down150and are willing to go to a time-out to finish the calming
process ....
Even with his can-do approach, Bodenhamer concedes that, at least
with violent children, some parents may be forced to resort to
15
wilderness programs (if they can afford them) or juvenile court. 1
Dr. James Dobson, a well-known psychologist and founder of Focus
on the Family, 152 has slightly more moderate views, which place him in
the Parental Control camp with respect to younger children and in the
Parental Influence camp with respect to adolescents. Dobson maintains
that parents must be loving but firm with their children and should
never let a young child get away with deliberate defiance of the parents'
authority. 153 Dobson believes that allowing a young child to speak

147.

ld. at 44.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 13-15.
150. Id. at 74.
151. Id. However, according to Bodenhamer, reliance on the juvenile court system is no
panacea as it may limit parental authority. Id.
152. Focus on the Family is a Christian-based organization that runs a website and publishes
literature dealing with family issues from the Christian perspective.
153. See generally JAMES DOBSON, THE STRONG-WILLED CHILD (1978).
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disrespectfully to, or refuse to obey, an adult is a mammoth mistake. 154
Dobson writes:
This kind of behavior, if unchecked, will continue to deteriorate day
by day, producing a more profound disrespect with each encounter. If
you don't discourage it, you can expect some wild experiences during
the adolescent years to come.
Thus, the behavior for which
punishment is most necessary is that involving a direct assault on the
leadership and personhood of the parent (or teacher), especially when
155
the child obviously knows he shouldn't be acting that way.
With children from the ages of about eighteen months though ten or
twelve years of age, Dobson is a firm believer in corporal
punishment. 156 For minor incidents where a child resists the parent,
Dobson recommends pinching the trapezius muscle to produce a sharp
pain, which, he claims, usually motivates immediate compliance with
the parent's command. 157 In other situations, Dobson advocates
spanking in the buttocks area, 158 either with a bare hand, or with an
object such as a belt or paddle. 159 Yet, Dobson also says that
"[c]orporal punishment should be a rather infrequent occurrence" 160 and
should be supplemented by time-outs, denial of privileges, and reward/
61
withholding programs. 1

154. Id. at 68-69
155. Id.
156. JAMES DOBSON, NEW DARE TO DISCIPLINE 65 (2d ed. 1992).
157. Id. at 38. Dobson suggests:
When a parent's calm request for obedience is ignored by a child, Mom or Dad should
have some means of making their youngster want to cooperate. For those who can
think of no such device, I will suggest one: it is [a] muscle lying snugly against the
base of the neck. Anatomy books list it as the trapezius muscle, and when firmly
squeezed, it sends little messengers to the brain saying, "This hurts: avoid recurrence at
all costs." The pain is only temporary; it can cause no damage. But it is an amazingly
effective and practical recourse for parents when their youngster ignores a direct
command to move.
Id.
158. Id. at 63. It should be noted that Dobson does not advocate this method of punishment
for parents who have a history of child abuse, or anyone else who is in danger of losing control.
Id. However, according to Dobson:
Many children desperately need this resolution to their disobedience. In those
situations when the child fully understands what he is being asked to do or not to do
but refuses to yield to adult leadership, an appropriate spanking is the shortest and most
effective route to an attitude adjustment. When he lowers his head, clenches his fists,
and makes it clear he is going for broke, justice must speak swiftly and eloquently.
Id. at 60-61.
159. Id. at 64.
160. Id. at 62.
161. Id. at 62, 105-17. Dobson calls this the "Law of Reinforcement." Id. at 105.
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Both Bodenhamer and Dobson insist that parents can elicit complete
compliance from children, but the clear implication of their approaches
is that this can be done only, at least with some children, by the use of
corporal punishment and sometimes significant physical force.
B. The ParentalInfluence Approach
In the case of adolescents, however, Dobson falls into the Parental
Influence group, which maintains that by adolescence, if not sooner,
physical control becomes a virtual impossibility, and the normal
psychological development of some independence from the parents
means that parents can at best steer their children in the direction of
desired behavior. The best a parent can hope for is that positive values
that have been instilled in the child from his early years are internalized
and will provide the basis for action in adolescence. For example,
Dobson believes that teenagers should never be spanked, both because
age and because it insults teenagers'
spanking is ineffective at that
162
emerging sense of adulthood.
Similarly, Dobson does not advocate use of the trapezius muscle
technique on adolescents: "I do not recommend that mothers weighing
less than ninety pounds try to squeeze the shoulder muscles of their big
The
teen-agers. There are definite risks involved in that procedure.
' 16 3
it."'
squeeze
don't
it,
reach
can't
you
'If
is,
general rule to follow
Instead, like the other Parental Influence proponents, Dobson relies
upon values internalized earlier in childhood and on incentive systems
to regulate the behavior of teenagers. 164 He provides an example:
To illustrate, a child should be required to keep his room relatively
neat when he is young. Then somewhere during the midteens, his
own self-discipline should take over and provide the motivation to

162. Id. at 72. Dobson believes that:
Teens desperately want to be thought of as adults, and they deeply resent being treated
like children. Spanking is the ultimate insult at that age, and they are justified in hating
it. Besides, it doesn't work. Discipline for adolescents and teens should involve lost
privileges, financial deprivation, and related forms of non-physical retribution.
Id.
163. DOBSON, supra note 153, at 107.
164. Id. at 66.
My concept is that parents should introduce their child to discipline and self-control by
the use of external influences when he is young. By being required to behave
responsibly, he gains valuable experience in controlling his own impulses and
resources. Then as he grows into the teen years, the transfer of responsibility is made
year by year from the shoulders of the parent directly to the child. He is no longer
forced to do what he has learned during earlier years.
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continue the task. If it does not, the65parent should close his door and
let him live in a dump, if necessary. 1
As the "closing the door and letting him live in a dump" option
illustrates, Dobson maintains that physical and psychological changes
make it impossible to control a teenager completely. 166 While he
admits that incentives can be useful with teenagers, Dobson emphasizes
that rapid physical growth and hormonal changes make teenagers
167
sluggish, even lazy, much of the time.
The main difference between Dobson and other proponents of the
Parental Influence approach is that other writers do not place emphasis
on controlling even young children as does Dobson. For example, in
her book Raising Children with Character,Elizabeth Berger describes a
pattern of successful parenting whereby parents teach values by parental
example; by controlling situations for small children; and by providing
loving guidance and reinforcement as the child internalizes positive
social values, such as honesty, hard work, discipline, and empathy for
others. 16 8 The parent's goal is to help the child deal with reality rather
than to obey the parent as an end in itself. 16 9 According to Berger, this
will not prevent teenagers from sometimes acting in ways that their
parents do not approve of, but it may minimize some of the conflicts
and difficulties so often experienced in adolescence. Berger maintains
that parents who have tried to control, rather than guide, their young
children are in for a rude shock when those children become teenagers
170
and can no longer be controlled.
165. Id.
166. DOBSON, supra note 156, at 98.
167. Id. According to Dobson:
The principles of reinforcement are particularly useful with teenagers, because such
rewards appeal to youngsters during this typically self-centered time of life. However,
laziness is an unavoidable fact of life with many adolescents. Their lack of
industriousness and general apathy has a physiological origin. Their energy during
early adolescence is being redirected into rapid growth. Also, glandular changes
require a physical readjustment. For several years they may want to sleep until noon
and drag themselves around until it comes time to do something that suits their fancy.
If any system will succeed in charging their sluggish batteries, it will probably involve
an incentive of some variety.
Id.
168. See generally BERGER, supra note 133.
169. Id. at 51-60.
170. Id. at 176.
Many parents, especially those who have approached their children by trying to
manage and control them, are bewildered by the needs of the adolescent, who is now
too big to control. This parent has trouble distinguishing between the distress he feels
at his teenager's ability to act on his own decisions and the distress he may feel at his
teenager making what seem to him to be bad decisions.
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Yet another author provides a perspective that focuses on the most
difficult children. In The Explosive Child, Ross W. Greene argues that
while many children respond to traditional parental discipline, some
children are naturally inflexible, easily frustrated, and generally
uncontrollable. 17 1 Greene, who is director of Cognitive-Behavioral
Psychology at the Clinical and Research Program in Pediatric
Psychopharmacology at Massachusetts General Hospital, has worked
with many such children, whom he refers to as inflexible-explosive
children. 172 For some unknown reason, which may include brain
chemistry, these children do not learn basic skills in coping with
frustration or new experiences. 17 3 Early in the book, Greene describes
the behavior of an eleven-year-old girl named Jennifer who becomes
physically and verbally aggressive at the least provocation. 174 In one
incident, Jennifer explodes and pushes her mother, knocks down a chair,
and screams because her mother is about to feed her younger brother
175
some frozen waffles Jennifer had been planning to eat the next day.
Greene observes that the parents of such children quickly learn that
time-honored disciplinary techniques (like reasoning, rewards, timeouts, or punishments) that work for other children are not effective with
176
children like Jennifer.
Greene's book offers insights and suggestions that might help parents
of explosive children help their children learn frustration-coping skills.
But Greene clearly does not think that these parents can "control" their
children. In fact, he believes that conventional parenting advice leads to
The wise parent who has controlled the situation for his small child has been able
to maintain a warm intimacy with the youngster; he has avoided, whenever possible,
the need to control the child directly and thus minimized conflicts and power struggles
within their relationship. The nature of the authority between the parent and child has
been predominately one of imparting wisdom and guidance, rather than constricting the
child's activity. The child admires the parent and is inspired to model himself after the
parent's leadership.
This approach pays off in adolescence, when of course the parent can no longer
control the situation. The adolescent no longer inhabits special environments created
by the parent; for the most part he inhabits and participates in the ordinary outside
world, with all of its problems and dangers. The parent, however, by virtue of his good
rapport with the adolescent, maintains a considerable influence over him. But this is
not control, because the adolescent has the power to make his own choices, based on
his inner resources.
Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

GREENE, supra note 134, at xi.
Id. at 5, 335-36.
Id. at 9-55.
Id. at 1-5.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 4.
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a great deal of guilt and self-blame on the part of parents of explosive
children, who conclude that the reason they can't control their children
is that they are doing something wrong. 177 Believing that the child's
bad behavior is due to poor parental teaching, they embark on a
178
program of unlearning, followed by supposedly better teaching.
Often, this re-teaching and unlearning process includes (1)
providing the child with lots of positive attention to reduce the
desirability of negative attention; (2) teaching parents to issue fewer
and clearer commands; (3) teaching the child that compliance is
expected and enforced on all parental commands and that he must
comply quickly because his parents are only going to issue a
command once or twice; (4) delivering consequences-rewards, such
as allowance money and special privileges, and punishments, such as
time-outs and the loss of privileges-contingent upon the child's
successful or unsuccessful fulfillment of specific target behaviors
(such as complying with adults' commands, doing homework, getting
ready for school); and (5) teaching the child that his parents won't
back down in the face of tantrums. This approach isn't magic; it
merely formalizes practices that have always been important
cornerstones of effective parenting: being clear about how a child
should and should not behave, consistently insisting on appropriate
179
behavior, and motivating the child to perform such behavior.
Greene acknowledges that "[s]ome parents and their children benefit
enormously from such formality,"'1 80 and others may benefit to some
extent. 18 1 Some of the parents and children who do not benefit from
such programs may miss out on benefits because the "parents fail to
implement such procedures correctly or consistently." 182 However, the
program might fail to work for another reason:
Children who are developmentally compromised in the skills of
flexibility and frustration tolerance may lack the capacity to (a)
manage the emotions associated with frustration well enough to think
clearly in the midst of frustration or (b) shift immediately and
consistently from their agenda to their parents' agenda, even when
faced with very meaningful consequences. And none of us can
consistently exhibit behaviors of which we are incapable,83 no matter
how enticing the reward or how aversive the punishment. 1

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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Hence, writers in the Parental Influence camp acknowledge the
importance of parental discipline and shaping of children's values.
However, they place greater emphasis on factors that tend to dilute
parental efforts, such as the child's free will, the child's developmental
imperative to move towards independence during adolescence, and, in
some cases, difficult personalities, which may or may not have a
physical component, such as a difference in brain chemistry. The
Parental Influence authors agree that these other factors make it
impossible for parents to actually control a child's behavior.
C. The Societal/PeerInfluence Approach
In her controversial book The Nurture Assumption, author Judith
Rich Harris argues a more extreme position. 184 She claims that far from
having control over their adolescents, parents don't even have much
influence over them. 185 Harris uses the term "nurture assumption" to
refer to "the assumption that what influences children's development,
apart from their genes, is the way their parents bring them up," 18 6 and
87
she spends her book debunking the assumption. 1
Harris maintains that young children and teenagers alike are
motivated largely by peer influence, and that a combination of inborn
188
personality and peer influence determines most of their behavior.
Harris does not totally discount adult influences; what Harris calls the
"parents' peer group" indirectly does pass on cultural norms to young
people, 18 9 and parents have control over who their child's peers will be
by virtue of the parent's power to choose or change neighborhoods or
schools. 190 However, Harris is critical of the accepted theory that
children learn most attitudes and behaviors at home. 19 1 She states that
our culture cherishes the belief that parents either can mold their
children into happy, successful adults or ruin their lives. 19 2 According
to Harris, society blames parents for their children's misdeeds,

184. JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION 2 (1998).
185. See id. passim.
'186. Id. at 2.
187. See id. passim.
188. Id. at 285-88.
189. Id. at 205-17.
190. Id. at 335-38.
191. Id. at 12-13.
192. Id. at 327 ("[Culture] has, as one of its cherished myths, the belief that parents have the
power to turn their children into happy and successful adults or to mess up their lives very badly.
The belief that if anything goes wrong, it must be the parents' fault.").
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exonerating children only by shifting blame for their actions to their
93
parents. 1
Harris' conclusions are based on an extensive critique of behavioral
and developmental research. She points to many studies of socialization
and behavioral genetics and concludes that there is no hard evidence for
the nurture assumption. 194 She cites the following conclusion from two
noted researchers, Eleanor Maccoby and John Martin, who published a
1983 review of the socialization research up to that time:
These findings imply strongly that there is very little impact of the
physical environment that parents provide for children and very little
impact of parental characteristics that must be essentially the same for
all children in a family: for example, education, or the quality of the
relationship between the spouses. Indeed, the implications are either
that parental behaviors have no effect, or that the only effective
aspects of parenting must
vary greatly from one child to the other
19 5
within the same family.
Harris says that, rather than picking the first alternative (which she
prefers), researchers adopted the second view and began focusing on the
19 6
differences in the way the same parents treat different children.
Harris concedes that this approach has some appeal because, after all,
parents do treat individual children differently. 19 7 Yet, this approach
198
makes it difficult to pin down the cause and effect of parental actions.
193. Id.
It is a harmless myth of our culture that children are born innocent and good, blank
slates for their parents to write upon. The other side of the myth-that if children do
not turn out as we hoped it must be their parents' fault-is not so harmless. We
exonerate the child only by putting the burden of blame on the parents.
Id.
194. Id. at 1-13.
195. Id. at 38 (quoting ELEANOR MACCOBY & JOHN MARTIN, REVIEW OF SOCIALIZATION
RESEARCH 82 (1983)).
196. Id. at 39-40.
197. Id. at 40.
198. Id.
But immediately we run into problems, because that path leads directly to an
endless loop of causes and effects. How do we know Mom didn't love you best
because you were better to begin with? Are you smart because you were labeled "the
brain" or were you labeled "the brain" because you were smart? If parents treat each
of their children differently, are they responding to the differences among their
children or are they causing them?
In order to get out of this loop, we need to show that parents are not simply
reacting to characteristics their children already had-characteristics they were born
with. We need to find a reason why a parent might behave differently toward two
children that cannot be attributed to genetic differences between them. Then-and this
is the tricky part-we need evidence that these differences in parental treatment
actually have effects on the children. We need evidence of parent-to-child effects,
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Harris claims that the research simply doesn't support the theory that
parents determine how their kids turn out. 199 She examines birth order
studies as examples of work that could have proven a connection
20 0
between parental behavior and child characteristics, but did not.
Harris claims that while birth order appears to impact how parents treat
their children, 20 1 it does not necessarily affect how the children turn
2
out.

20

Harris examines some of the academic research and concludes that
there really is no evidence for a birth order effect, despite some
unsupported pop psychology pronouncements. 20 3
She examines
research on parenting styles and concludes that it yields similarly
conflicting and inconclusive results. 2°4
Finally, she looks at
environmental influences outside of the family, most notably peer group
influences, and concludes that these have huge and lasting effects on
how children behave and how they ultimately turn out. 20 5 Parental
lifestyle, personality, and parenting style have, in Harris' view, been
vastly overrated.
Harris' book takes an extreme position, and other child-raising gurus
have not joined her. Yet, even moderate theorists agree with parts of
her theory. For example, in his book Bringing Up Boys, Dr. James
Dobson points out the limits of parental influence in response to a
question from a discouraged father who tried to parent well, but now
has a sixteen-year-old son who "is dour, disrespectful, and defiant" in
addition to being "in serious trouble with the law." 20 6 Dobson writes:
because if all we've got are child-to-parent effects we haven't shown that parents have
any influence whatever on how their children turn out.
Id.
199. Id. at 52.
200. Id. at 40-45.
201. Id.at4l.
The firstborn and secondborn have equal chances in the lottery in which genes are
handed out, but once they are born they find themselves in very different
microenvironments.
They have different experiences in the home, and these
experiences can be predicted with some accuracy on the basis of which one was born
first. The firstborn has the parents' full attention for at least a year and then suddenly
is "dethroned" and has to compete with a rival; the secondborn has competition right
from the start. The firstborn is reared by nervous, inexperienced parents; the
secondborn by parents who know (or think they know) what they're doing. Parents
give firstborns more responsibility, more blame, and less independence.
Id.
202. Id. at 40-45.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 45-49.
205. Id. at 54-77, 146-82, 218-63.
206. JAMES DOBSON, BRINGING UP BOYS 224 (2001).
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Before you take the blame for everything that has happened, I urge
you to stop and think about what has occurred. All of us who work
with kids have observed that a teen's rebellious behavior sometimes
results not from parental mistakes or failures but from bad choices
made on his own initiative. Your child may be one of these teens.
Two things are clear from this understanding. First, parents have
been quick to take the credit or blame for the way their children turn
out. Moms and dads who are raising bright young superstars are
inclined to stick out their chests and say, "Look at what we
accomplished." Those with irresponsible kids wonder, "Where did we
go wrong?" It is very possible that neither assessment is accurate.
Even though parents are enormously influential in the lives of their
children, they are only one component from which children are
207
assembled.
Similarly, writers like Ross Greene, who focus on temperamentally
difficult children, would agree that there are limits to parental influence
on a child's functioning and personality. 20 8 Otherwise, the notion of
"explosive children" would not make sense.
D. Views on Adolescent Rebellion
The extent to which the normal adolescent movement toward
independence includes "acting out" behaviors such as drinking, truancy,
running away, avoiding parents, or other disobedience is a matter of
some dispute among experts. Elizabeth Berger, the child and adolescent
psychiatrist quoted above, maintains that appropriate adolescent
independence does not include outright rebellion, which she says "is a
sign that something has deflected [the teenager's] energies away from
his natural interest in mastering the world and taking his rightful place
in it as a mature individual. 20 9
Other writers see rebellious acts as within the range of normal
adolescent behavior, either because of peer influence or because of an
intrinsically more oppositional character. For example, in The Nurture
Assumption, Judith Rich Harris argues that too much credit and blame
has been leveled at parents, when in fact an adolescent's behavior is
most likely the result of his own personality and peer group
2 10
influence.
207. Id. Dobson goes on to state that in addition to influences from nutrition, genetic heritage,
biochemistry, and parental influence, "God has created us as unique individuals, capable of
independent and rational thought that is not attributable to any source." Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 177-83 (exploring Greene's views on the ability of
parents to control and influence their children).
209. BERGER, supra note 133, at 175.
210. HARRIS, supra note 184, at 285-88.
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In The Explosive Child, Ross Greene discusses how his program for
helping younger explosive children develop coping skills must be
adapted to an individual teenager's situation, because alienated
teenagers have a tendency to affiliate with similarly alienated teenagers,
making them harder to reach. 2 11 While Greene clearly does not view
self-destructive and risky behavior as inevitable, he seems to see it as
increasingly likely for a child whose coping skills are not great and who
2 12
affiliates with similarly situated adolescents.
Part of Greene's program involves doing battle with the child only in
very important circumstances, such as those in which one's physical
safety is at risk.2 13 Parents also must be sure that a rule is actually
enforceable before they try to impose it. 2 14 Therefore, Greene says that
parents of unruly teenagers should not consider drug use and sexual
promiscuity as non-negotiable because, while they involve physical
safety, they are not rules that a parent realistically can enforce. 2 15 "In
other words," Greene summarizes, "I have more faith that rebuilding
your relationship with your teenager will reduce self-destructive
behavior and keep your child from being arrested than pretending you
can enforce the unenforceable."2 16 Greene believes that parents can
work with their children to help those children develop the kind of
internal controls and emotional skills that will help them deal with
situations constructively and make fewer self-destructive choices.
Parental control over specific behaviors, however, is impossible when
the teenager is outside a parent's purview, and may be impossible even
when a teenager is in the parent's presence.
James Garbarino and Clare Bedard, two researchers known for their
work with delinquent teenagers, claim that secretive and rebellious
behavior is common not only among troubled teens but among highachieving ones. 2 17 According to Garbarino and Bedard,
When asked: "Did your parents know about everything you did when
you were a teenager that was dangerous or dishonest?" most of us
would answer "no." And we can assume that today's teenagers are
not telling their parents everything either. The question, though, is
"What aren't they telling their parents?" To test this out, we gave a
questionnaire to first-year undergraduate students at Cornell
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

GREENE, supra note 134, at 258.
Id.
Id. at 133-36.
Id. at 134
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
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University, an Ivy League college where our surveyed students
predominantly come from two-parent families of means. The results
indicate, not surprisingly, that many of the students had some secret
life of which their parents were, almost by definition, unaware. What
did surprise us, however, is the seriousness of some of the events these
students kept from their parents throughout their teens and until then,
even though the vast majority of these students were living in families
with intact marriages, where both parents were present and involved in
their children's lives. The point being that, even in families where
conditions were good for maintaining a healthy level of supervision of
teens, teens still managed to keep dramatic2 18events in their lives from
ever reaching their parents' consciousness.
Garbarino and Bedard go on to describe the behaviors that these
high-achieving adolescents had managed to conceal, and they were
indeed serious. 2 19 The teenagers reported incidents of hard drug use,
stealing, arrests, visiting adults-only websites, suicidal thoughts and
suicide attempts, heavy drinking, vandalizing property, being raped,
engaging in voluntary sex, having abusive boyfriends, being mugged,
and driving under the influence. 2 20 The authors examine research on
why parents are not always aware of what their children are doing and
conclude that if a child really doesn't want to communicate "the
parents' efforts cannot be effective. '"221 Of course, the clear implication
is that if a parent cannot get full information without the adolescent's
cooperation, then the parent cannot control the child's actions without
her cooperation either.
Despite variation in perspectives and details, the fairly representative
authors referred to above seem to agree on several points. First,
conscientious parents can have influence on how children develop
coping and other social skills. Second, at least children of certain
"easier" temperaments will respond to parental discipline of traditional
sorts. This gives the illusion that parents are controlling the children,
but, in fact, none of the authors claims that. What seems to happen is
that the consequences parents can impose on their children will
influence those of a certain character type to make parentally approved
choices. Children of other character types may not respond to the
parental directives at all. Finally, "control" of specific behavior is not
possible since teenagers have free will and the autonomy to use it. Peer
influence, opportunities for risky activities, and the urge to be

218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102-05.
Id.
Id. at 107.
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independent will all influence a teenager's behavior, maybe as much or
more than parenting techniques.
IV. SHOULD COURTS HOLD PARENTS ACCOUNTABLE?

In light of the above findings, it is appropriate to question whether it
is good policy for the law to hold parents accountable for the behavior
of their adolescent and pre-adolescent children. There are several
possible policy justifications for such accountability. The most obvious
is the goal of forcing the parents to "make" their children behave in a
certain way, such as visiting a non-custodial parent 2 22 or attending
school. 223 In light of the above materials, this does not seem like a
valid justification because uniform behavior control of that type is
224
probably impossible.
However, there are at least three other possible justifications. First,
holding parents accountable may be the most economically efficient
2 25
way to get a significant percentage of kids to behave a certain way.
Second, punishing parents for their children's misdeeds may be a form
of retribution by a society angry about adolescents perceived as out of
control. 226 Third, punishing the parents of erring children may have a
deterrent effect on parents who might lean toward letting up too much
227
on their own children.
A. Economic Efficiency
Holding parents accountable may reflect a belief that parents are in a
unique position to offer incentives to their own children at the lowest
cost to the rest of society. 228 This is analogous to what Guido Calabresi
called "the cheapest.., cost avoider" in torts. 229 The cheapest cost
avoider is the person who could, at the least expense, prevent something

222. See supra Part II.A (discussing court approaches to enforcing parental visitation rights
when a child refuses to visit).
223. See supra Part II.B (reviewing approaches to truancy issues).
224. See supra Part III (discussing the feasibility of parental control over the behavior of
children).
225. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing economic efficiency as a reason for holding parents
accountable).
226. See infra Part IV.B (exploring retribution as a justification for holding parents
accountable).
227. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the use of parental accountability to deter the use of
flawed parenting practices and visitation order violations).
228. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (setting forth a law
and economics theory to reduce accident costs).
229. See id. at 135 n.1.
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bad from happening. 2 30 In the context of a parent-child relationship, a
parent typically has ready access to a child and some control over living
arrangements and finances. Leaving aside extreme cases where teenage
children run away or achieve total economic independence through
legal or illegal employment, most parents can exercise quite a bit of
This sort of
influence by controlling money and car privileges.
influence is less costly than the sorts of influence that other authorities
can exercise, such as expulsion or suspension from school or arrests for
violations of various ordinances applicable to juveniles. Violation of
such ordinances might require formal or informal hearings, legal
representation, lost workdays for parents, or other time-consuming and
The argument for parental accountability
expensive procedures.
essentially is that accountability will motivate the parents, who can act
most quickly and cost effectively, to assert their influence over their
23 1
offspring.
Related to this argument is the theory that since many parents of
children can influence their children's behavior with traditional
parenting techniques, society should impose accountability to make all
parents attempt to do so. As a result, parents will influence many
children to comply with the desired behavior. Even if incentives such
as loss of allowance or car keys will not work for every recalcitrant
child, they will work for many, and the more parents who are motivated
to crack down, the more children will become acquiescent. Despite the
variety of parenting philosophies discussed above, this approach has
some support in all of the authorities cited.
For example, the strict control approach of Gregory Bodenhamer is
based on the presumption that any sufficiently motivated parent can
control all but the most outrageously out-of-line and violent
It stands to reason that Bodenhamer would
adolescents. 23 2
acknowledge the potential benefits of motivating parents with the threat
of punishment.
James Dobson is less optimistic about absolute control of
adolescents, but he clearly believes that parents who consistently use
good disciplinary techniques are the most likely to have appropriately

230. Id. at 135-40.
231. See, for example, the visitation cases in Part H.A, where the judicial expectation is that
the threat of incarceration of the custodial parent for contempt would result in the prompt
production of the child for visitation. See also supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text, where
proponents of parental accountability for truancy argue that the threats motivate parents to ensure
that their children will attend school.
232. See BODENHAMER, supra note 138, at 74.

2004]

You Can't Make Me!

behaved children of all ages. 2 33 Thus, the notion of motivating parents
to act properly is not inconsistent with his theories. On the other hand,
his general resistance to any state encroachment on areas he deems
properly within the purview of the family 2 34 may actually make him
less sympathetic to this approach than any other author discussed,
2 35
except for Judith Rich Harris.
A parent who has followed the approach exemplified by Elizabeth
Berger and has built a strong rapport with an adolescent likely will have
a great deal of success influencing that child's behavior with traditional
techniques. 23 6 Moreover, since the rapport presupposes an affection for
and identification with the parent, the child most likely would be
motivated to save the parent from fines, imprisonment for contempt,
237
and other bad outcomes.
The approach represented by The Explosive Child offers more
23 8
qualified support for the notion of providing an incentive for parents.
The parents of explosive children may not be able to induce their
children to behave in a certain way, but Ross Greene is quick to point
out that the majority of children are not chronically inflexible and will
respond to traditional acts of good parenting. 239 So, if the cheapest,
most efficient solution for the greatest number is the goal, Greene might
have some sympathy for this approach, at least as a first attempt at
results.
The approach exemplified by Judith Rich Harris's theory that most
children are more responsive to peers than to parents is least compatible
240
with the notion of punishing parents to motivate better parenting.
However, even Harris admits that some children are much more

233. DOBSON, supra note 156, at 217.
234. See, e.g., id. (advocating that parents, rather than schools, should ideally teach children
about sex). "There is a growing trend for all aspects of education to be taken from the hands of
parents (or the role is deliberately forfeited by them). This is a mistake." Id.
235. See generally supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text (discussing Harris' views).
Since Harris contends that parental influence has only minimal impact on adolescent behavior,
punishing parents as a way of motivating their influence does not make sense under her theory.
236. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of guiding a
child's behavior rather than attempting to control it).
237. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (explaining that the guidance approach to
shaping a child's behavior can be successful in instilling positive social values in a child).
238. See supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (explaining that while some children
respond to traditional parental discipline, others generally are uncontrollable).
239. See GREENE, supra note 134, at 96-98.
240. See supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text (discussing Harris' argument that
children are more responsive to peers than to parents).
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acquiescent than others. 24 1 If we presume that there is a significant
percentage of reasonably compliant children, parent accountability may
still be a reasonably efficient approach. Harris' theory also admits the
possibility that cultural norms influence children. 242 If we presume that
these norms could include visiting with both parents after they divorce
and attending school, then enforcing these norms in the law might make
sense as well.
What about the children who do not respond? According to Greene,
at least some of those who do not respond will fail to do so because
their parents were not consistent enough or diligent enough to get good
results. 24 3 It might make sense to hold them accountable too, to make
them more diligent. However, there may be a fairness issue in holding
parents accountable when a good faith diligent application of accepted
parenting techniques has failed because the adolescent was chronically
inflexible by nature or unduly influenced by peers. If a parent is
making every effort to exact the adolescent's compliance with the law
to no avail, it seems unjust to hold the parent accountable anyway.
However, if we assume that the parent could have prevented the
adolescent rebellion with earlier, more appropriate
action,
accountability still might be justified.
B. Retribution
The second possibility is that punishing a parent for a child's
misdeeds has a retributive effect that is perceived as just. The theory is
that while the parent may not be able to force or prevent a specific
behavior today, if the parent had engaged in the appropriate parenting
techniques when the child was younger and more malleable, the
teenager might have turned out differently. So the parent is being
punished for past mistakes. Berger, Dobson, and to a lesser extent
Greene provide some support for this approach. Berger believes that if
parents adequately control the situation and build rapport with children
beginning when they are very small, adolescent rebellion and selfdestructive acts will be minimized. 24 Similarly, Dobson maintains that
it is important for parents to assume positive leadership over children
when children are small because it is very difficult to undo parenting

241. See HARRIS, supra note 184, at 318. "The adolescents who can be monitored are the
ones who are willing to be monitored, and they are the ones who need it least." Id.
242. See id. at 183-217, 356-59.
243. See GREENE, supra note 134, at 88-89.
244. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing Berger's argument that
parents should attempt to guide a child's behavior rather than control it).
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mistakes once adolescence begins. 24 5 Greene advocates working with
inflexible, explosive children early on, so that they can develop the
frustration tolerance they will need to weather adolescence. 246 He does
not believe that adolescence is too late but does suggest that meaningful
change will be much more difficult to accomplish during that rocky
developmental period.24 7 Even Harris, with her emphasis on corrosive
peer and societal influences, admits that parents can move children from
to a more positive one by switching the child's school or
one peer group
24 8
residence.
Extrapolating from these theories, one could conclude that if earlier
action that is more appropriate to the individual child in question might
have averted the current undesirable behavior, then many would believe
that punishing the hapless parents for what turned out to be an
ineffective parenting choice is justified. Yet Judith Rich Harris argues

of their
that this is an unfair attack on parents who, through no fault
24 9

own, gave birth to more difficult, less responsive offspring.
A related issue is whether it is fairer to focus on parental actions or
parental results. Most legal issues of parental accountability focus on
actions and whether they were appropriate. Did a parent provide
2 50
reasonable amounts of food and shelter? Was discipline excessive?
245. See DOBSON, supra note 156, at 75-76.
246. See GREENE, supra note 134, at 258-59.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (discussing how parents have control
over their child's peers).
249. HARRIS, supra note 184, at 317-18. Harris writes,
I see it in the news all the time; it always makes me angry. The Smith kid gets into
trouble and the judge threatens to throw his parents in jail. The Jones kid burglarizes a
house and his parents are fined for their failure to "exercise reasonable control" over
his activities. The Williams kid gets pregnant and her parents are criticized for not
keeping track of where she was and what she was doing. One set of parents, when they
found it impossible to keep their teenage daughter out of trouble, chained her to the
radiator. They were arrested for child abuse.
Blaming the parents is easy if you've never been in their shoes. Sometimes
chaining the kid to the radiator is the only thing they haven't tried. The parents of
reasonably well-behaved teenagers don't realize how crucially their ability to monitor
their kid's activities depends upon the willing cooperation of the kid. An unwilling
teenager cannot be monitored; my husband and I found that out. Kids can always
outwit you if they really want to. If you try to enforce your rules by grounding them,
they don't come home at all. If you stop giving them an allowance they mooch off
their friends or steal. The adolescents who can be monitored are the ones who are
willing to be monitored, and they are the ones who need it least. Parents have
remarkably little power to maintain control over the adolescents who need it most.
Id.
250. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (West 2003) (defining child abuse); id. § 48.13
(defining the grounds for jurisdiction over a child in need of protection or services).
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Courts usually judge these parental actions or failures relative to what
other similarly situated parents reasonably would do under the
25 1
circumstances.
It seems fair to judge a parent's actions by comparing them to those
of other reasonable parents.
If a reasonable parent would try
conventional parenting schemes, such as rewards and punishments (like
denial of privileges), then it may be unfair to penalize a parent who
follows the same course, even if the hoped for results are not achieved.
Nonetheless, it may be reasonable to hold parents accountable if they
either do not act, or if they give up after their first attempts at discipline
prove unsuccessful. Perhaps the standard should be reasonable parental
perseverance rather than complete success.
However, determining that it is not fair to punish parents when their
good faith attempts at child discipline are unsuccessful leaves open the
question of what the law could do instead to punish the wrongful
actions of the pre-adolescent or adolescent. The usual alternative is to
punish the offending child directly. It must be understood, however,
that many punishments directed at offending children end up punishing
the parents as well. Any significant fine imposed on a child likely will
be paid by the parent, who may then try to get the child to pay back the
debt. Expelling a child from school leaves the parent with the difficult
problem of what to do with the child, and it may force the parent to seek
expensive options such as private school, boarding school, or tutoring.
Where the lives of minors and their parents necessarily are intertwined,
it is difficult to isolate punishing one from punishing the other.
C. Deterrence
The third possibility is that courts are holding accountable the parents
of erring children to deter them from their current unsuccessful
parenting practices, to deter their children from resisting visitation or
school attendance, or to deter other parents from failing to raise their
children appropriately.
The first possible justification for using threats of parental
punishment as a deterrent, namely the theory that the threat of
punishment will deter some bad parenting practices, has some
251. For example, if a child's diet is deficient, this may not constitute neglect if the parents are
poor and are providing the best diet they can afford. See id. § 48.13(10m) (allowing that a child
may be subject to court jurisdiction if the parent has failed to provide "for reasons other than
poverty... necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care or shelter so as to endanger
seriously the physical health of the child" (emphasis added)). However, if the parents have a
good income and still fail to feed their children adequately, the parents may be judged neglectful.
See id.
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credibility.
It is impossible to know how many parents have
successfully cracked down on their children to avoid being fined or held
in contempt of court. Yet, there is anecdotal evidence that deterrence
works with at least some parents. For example, the suburban police
chief cited in Part II.B attributed the lack of actual parental citations for
child truancy to the deterrent effect of the threat of penalties. 25 2 In
some of the custody cases discussed above, it is clear that the custodial
parent altered his behavior (although not always successfully) in hopes
of avoiding punishment. 25 3 For example, the father in Ex parte Rosser
grounded his daughter and took away her car privileges in an attempt to
get her to comply with the terms of the visitation order. 254 Although the
father in Ex parte Rosser was unsuccessful, there is no telling how
many other similarly situated parents have made successful efforts at
disciplining their children into compliance.
Whether using threats to punish parents will result in good parenting
that therefore leads to improved child behavior depends in part on
whether the children's misbehavior is indeed attributable to their
parents' action or lack thereof. All of the child-rearing authors
discussed in this Article recognize situations where adolescents have
gone astray despite their parents' best efforts. The legal system must
question whether it is fair to punish parents to deter bad parenting where
parents have endeavored to use good parenting practices, but where
their attempts have not yielded the hoped-for adolescent compliance.
Deterrence is, in theory, aimed at changing behavior; once the behavior
has changed, there is no clear moral justification for punishment.
The second possible justification for using parental punishment as a
deterrent, that adolescents will alter their behavior to avoid adverse
consequences to their parents, has less credibility. While deterring
adolescents by threatening to punish their parents is no doubt successful
with some children, this approach obviously has been unsuccessful with
the truly resistant offspring whose parents end up in court facing fines
or incarceration. 255 If the deterrent method had been successful, these
situations simply would not have gone so far. Deterring teenagers'
behavior by creating consequences for third parties (their parents) seems

252.

See supra text accompanying note 124 (quoting a suburban police chief's views on the

effectiveness of citation threats).
253. See supra Part II.A (discussing cases where children resisted attending court-ordered
visitation, which resulted in the custodial parent being sued).
254. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing the court's holding in Ex parte
Rosser).
255. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing cases where custodial parents faced incarceration
because their children refused to submit to visitation or were habitually truant).
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suspect. For one thing, teenagers are notorious for their feelings of
invulnerability (the "it won't happen to me" attitude). For another
thing, teenagers are, on average, more self-centered than mature adults
and may not consider effects on their parents to be a sufficient
2 56
deterrent.
In addition, if theorists like Greene are right, the most troublesome
youngsters simply may not have the ability to alter certain behavior in
response to a threatened consequence. 25 7 In such cases, consequences
threatened against a parent have no effect on the teenager, and even if
the consequences affect the parents' behavior, the desired outcome will
only be achieved if the parent can readily pick an effective alternative
approach to disciplining the child. While the idea that some children
will be deterred may seem to be a valid justification for punishing
parents, it is difficult to justify punishing all parents, including those
whose children are, by nature, unresponsive to this approach.
The third possible justification for using parental punishment as a
deterrent is to ensure that other parents of potentially problem
adolescents will straighten out their own parenting practices to avoid
suffering punishment in the event that their own children step out of
line. The reasoning goes like this: if an overly lax parent sees that Mrs.
X was fined for her child's misbehavior, Mrs. X may be inclined to
crack down to avoid similar consequences from her own child's
misbehavior.
It is possible that parents, concerned about the punishments imposed
on others for lax parenting, might alter their behavior to avoid a similar
fate. Ironically, the other parents may be motivated to crack down on
their own kids even if the punished parents legitimately tried to control
their offspring but were unsuccessful because of factors beyond the
parents' control. For an observing parent to become motivated to parent
more strictly, he or she need only believe that the punished parents
could have controlled their children by acting differently whether or not
that was in fact the case. Punishing people to motivate others, however,
presents fairness issues that are not resolved easily, particularly where
the punished persons did not have real control over the outcome of the
situations. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the stricter parenting
practices that may be induced in the observing parents will be any more
successful than those of their fined or imprisoned cohorts.

256. See DOBSON, supra note 156, at 98 (describing the teenage years as a "typically self-

centered time of life").
257. See supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (discussing Greene's theory that some
children are uncontrollable).
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D. Consideringthe Visitation Cases
Applying these principles to the custody cases analyzed in Part II.A
demonstrates some of the implications. For example, consider the case
of Rideout v. Rideout, in which the court found a mother in contempt for
failing to deliver her thirteen-year-old daughter Caroline for courtordered visitation with her father. 2 58 The mother claimed that she tried
to persuade the reluctant Caroline to visit her father but believed that it
would be impossible to force her. 259 The record showed no concrete
effort on the mother's part to get Caroline to comply, other than the
alleged efforts to persuade her.2 60 The record also showed that the
mother had made excuses for Caroline and had covered for her when
she refused to visit her father. 26 1 The appeals court rejected the
mother's claims of innocence and concluded that she had contributed to
the child's reluctance and failed to 26make
reasonable efforts to ensure
2
compliance with the visitation order.
The fact that the mother apparently had failed even to attempt to use
conventional methods of parental persuasion may have been the factor
that led the court to be so unsympathetic to her claims of impossibility.
Had the mother attempted to ground the girl, to withhold allowance or
privileges, or to offer rewards for compliance, her position might have
been stronger. On the one hand, the daughter may have been in the
rather large percentage of youngsters who respond to these tactics most
of the time, according to the child-rearing books discussed in Part III.
On the other hand, if the daughter did not respond and the mother could
show that she had been forceful and consistent in applying these
parenting techniques, the court may have found that the mother had
made reasonable efforts to comply.
The court may have acted to induce the mother to behave differently
with respect to paternal visitation. However, there was an unmistakable
punitive element in this case as well. In the court's view, the mother
did not act properly and she must pay the price. 263 Of course, the
mother also was punished because the court concluded that she had

258. Rideout v. Rideout, 40 P.3d 1192, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), aff'd, 77 P.3d 1174
(Wash. 2003). See generally supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing Rideout).
259. Rideout, 40 P.3d at 1195.
260. See id. at 1196 (stating that "the record supports a finding that [the mother] both
contributed to Caroline's recalcitrance and failed to make reasonable efforts to require her to visit
[her father]").
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1195-97.
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contributed to the child's recalcitrance.264 This is a troubling element in
all of the contested-visitation cases. Trial courts are certainly in a
unique position to observe nuances that might indicate that the custodial
265
parent is trying to turn the child against the other parent.
Unfortunately, however, there are few divorces without any rancor or
bitterness, and if judges believe that parents should control their
children, there is always the possibility that those judges will conclude
that parental maliciousness exists behind every recalcitrant child. Given
what we know about adolescent behavior, attitudes, and rebellion, this
266
presumes a level of power that few parents actually have.
Finally, a desire for deterrence probably motivated the court as well.
Of course, there is the obvious objective of preventing the mother from
acquiescing to the daughter's refusal to visit her father for the duration
of the girl's minority. There is also the hope that other parents who may
be tempted to get back at their ex-spouses by interfering with child
visitation will be deterred from doing so after seeing what happens to
parents like Caroline's mother. Despite the fact that divorced parents
do not, as a group, study appellate family law cases, there is word-ofmouth information, plus the occasional human interest story in the local
newspaper, which will suffice to get the word out.
Consider another case discussed above, Ex parte Rosser, which
involved a seventeen-year-old daughter who flatly refused to go to
court-ordered visitation with her mother. 267 Unlike the Rideout case, in
which the mother did little, if anything, to ensure compliance, this case
involved a father who had encouraged and pleaded with the daughter on
the one hand and had grounded her and taken away car privileges for
her noncompliance on the other hand. 2 68 The daughter even testified
that she would run away to a friend's house if her father tried to drag
her into the car for visits. 269 Still, the appellate court upheld the lower
court's conclusion that the father possessed the ability to c6mply with
270
the visitation order.
Again, we can see that the court was motivated by the three
objectives we have identified: incentive to parent more effectively,
264. Id. at 1196.
265. Courts can, of course, observe things such as body language and voice inflection, which
cannot be detected from the record.
266. See supra Part 111 (discussing whether parents really have control over their children).
267. Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). See generally supra notes
54-65 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte Rosser).
268. Ex parte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d at 384.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 386.
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retribution, and deterrence. 27 1 Despite the absence of any evidence on
the record of encouragement or collusion by the father of the daughter's
noncompliance, the trial court did not accept the father's claim that he
was unable to make the daughter visit. Thus, by holding the father
responsible, the court endeavored to induce the father to take some
unspecified but effective action to make the daughter comply. The
accountability is supposed to spur the father on to a mode of more
effective parenting, whatever that might be. We also see retribution
because the father clearly is being punished for the fact that his daughter
is not complying with the visitation order. Finally, there is an implicit
message of deterrence to others: "Beware ye parents whose children
refuse to visit non-custodial parents. We will assume the parents are
complicit, even if we cannot figure out how. So don't even think about
letting your child get away with this!"
The outcome in Ex parte Rosser is not supportable under most of the
child-rearing theories we have discussed. It is clearly contrary to the
"parents have little influence over adolescents" view espoused by Judith
Rich Harris. 272 Similarly, the outcome is not supported by any of the
Parental Influence theorists. 273 For example, Greene's work does not
support the outcome. 27 4 The daughter's testimony that her father could
not drag her to do anything and that she would run away to a friend's
house if he tried might be construed as evidence that she was less
responsive to traditional parenting methods, even if she did not exhibit
the volatility of some of Greene's explosive children. The fact that the
daughter refused to go, even when faced with the prospect of her father
being jailed for contempt, 2 75 provides further support for the theory that
she is more resistant to parental persuasion than many kids her age.
According to Greene's approach, punishing the father is unlikely to
produce the desired results.
Even Berger's approach in Raising Children with Characterdoes not
support punishing the father in these circumstances. 276 On the one
hand, one could argue that if the father had established a stronger,
healthier relationship with his daughter when she was younger, she
would have been more likely to comply with her father's requests (and
the visitation order). However, that ignores the positive relationship the
271. See supra Part IV.A-C (discussing the three objectives of court action: economic
efficiency, retribution, and deterrence).
272. See supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text (discussing Harris' view).
273. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Parental Influence approach).
274. See supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (discussing Greene's work).
275. Exparte Rosser, 899 S.W.2d at 384.
276. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing Berger's work).
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mother should have developed with the daughter at the same time.
Placing the entire onus on the father ignores the role that the nonIf parental
custodial mother also plays in this turn of events.
relationships are the key to a relatively smooth transition to adulthood,
surely each parent should bear the consequences of his own relationship
with the child in the absence of actual interference by the other parent.
There was admittedly no such evidence here.
Possible justification for the court's approach in Ex parte Rosser
could be found in the parental control theory of Gregory
Bodenhamer. 277 Since Bodenhamer advocates physical control of
adolescents, including such techniques as holding a teen's hand and
forcing her to write homework, it is logical to assume that he would
advocate physically dragging a reluctant teen to visitation with a noncustodial parent. However, cases specifically mandating this level of
parental physical force toward a child refusing to visit are notably
absent. Why they are absent is not clear. It may be that on some level,
conscious or not, judges share the more moderate view of writers such
is
as James Dobson that with teens, physical punishment
27 8
developmentally inappropriate and does not work anyway.
E. Truant Children
It is also reasonable to ask whether punishing parents when their
children are habitually truant from school constitutes good public policy
according to the principles discussed above. 279 Consider a hypothetical
case. Sixteen-year-old Lance Lax has missed half of the scheduled
school days this semester. If we fine or jail his mother Mrs. Lax, will
we have motivated the person in the best position to change Lance's
behavior? Will we justifiably have punished bad parenting or provided
a deterrent to Mrs. Lax, other parents of truants, or Lance himself? It is
impossible to say without more information about Mrs. Lax's parenting
and Lance's personality.
On the one hand, Mrs. Lax might be the picture of upright parenting.
She may drag Lance out of bed each morning and threaten, bribe, or
cajole him into the car. She may drop him off at the front door of the
school on time each day. If he walks through the school and sneaks out
the back door, she may punish him when the school notifies her of his
absence. Lance may or may not respond to these techniques. If he has
a difficult personality, or if he has fallen in with a bad crowd and has
277.
278.
279.

See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text (discussing Bodenhamer's work).
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cronies to encourage his truancy, his mother's efforts to ensure his
compliance with attendance rules may come to naught. If he does not
comply, there is little more she could do except accompany him to
school or hire someone else to do so. Either option might present an
insurmountable economic burden, such as loss of work days (and
ultimately her job) or the prohibitive cost of hiring someone else to
accompany him to school.
If we presume the levels of parental diligence set out in the foregoing
example, it seems that only Bodenhamer (the most extreme of the
Parental Control theorists) would claim that Mrs. Lax can and should do
more. Since Bodenhamer advocates parental supervision amounting to
lockdown in cases of total noncompliance by an adolescent, 280 it
appears that he would favor penalizing Mrs. Lax unless she
accompanies Lance to school, locks him in his room at night, and
otherwise assures that he is where he should be, doing what he should
be doing, at all times. Authors such as Berger, Dobson, and even
Greene might entertain the idea of consequences for Mrs. Lax on the
retributive theory: if she had provided more structure and discipline
earlier in Lance's life, perhaps she would have a better behaved son
today. However, since her current disciplinary techniques are well
within the expected range of parental responses to a misbehaving child,
it is more likely that the Parental Influence crowd would conclude that
Lance is an especially difficult teen and that punishing Mrs. Lax would
be unlikely to result in either her parenting more effectively or a
socially fair outcome. Peer Influence theorists such as Harris would
likely view Lance Lax as an example of how even the most diligently
28 1
parented teens can engage in appalling behavior.
On the other hand, Mrs. Lax may be complicit in Lance's behavior.
She may communicate to him that she does not see school as valuable.
She may even encourage him to stay home, care for younger siblings, or
complete tasks for the family. She simply may not make the effort to
get him up and out the door in the morning. When the school calls with
absence reports, she may lie for Lance or ignore the reports and impose
no consequences on Lance.
In this second scenario, there is a lot more Mrs. Lax could do to
facilitate Lance's school attendance. It is clear that whether or not she
has actual control over her son's behavior, she is not even exercising the
legitimate influence that all of the child-rearing theorists agree a parent
can and should exercise. Mrs. Lax is clearly the person in the best
280.
281.

See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text (discussing Bodenhamer's approach).
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position to influence Lance, and the fear of a hefty fine may be just the
incentive she needs. If she does receive a fine, other parents who are
headed down the same path may reevaluate their actions, assuming their
own homes are not so chaotic as to make that kind of reasoned action
unlikely.
Thus, in this case, punishing Mrs. Lax may indeed motivate more
effective parenting on her part, justly penalizing her for failing to fulfill
her parental obligations and deterring other unmotivated parents from
falling into the same trap. The key from a policy perspective will be
determining whether Mrs. Lax falls into the category of diligent but
unsuccessful parents or into the category of negligent parents.
F. What Courts Should Do
As the above analysis shows, punishing parents for certain types of
misbehavior by their children may be reasonably good policy in some
cases, but it may cause grave injustice in other cases. I propose that
courts resolve this dilemma by making implicit assumptions of parental
control over minors into a rebuttable presumption that parents are in
control. Parents could rebut the presumption with evidence that they
consistently have engaged in reasonable parenting behavior, such as
communicating with their children and using rewards and punishments
to induce conforming behavior. The presumption would be reinforced
by actual evidence that the parent had colluded in the child's
misbehavior, but collusion could not be inferred merely from the child's
noncompliance.
In the case of children who resist visitation with a non-custodial
parent, this approach would enable courts to advance the legitimate
objective of assuring that the child experience continuing contact with
both parents, if the parents are fit, because it would place the primary
responsibility for encouraging the visits on the parent who is most likely
to have at least some control over the child. It would not facilitate
parental game playing or turning children against the other parent
because evidence of those blatant activities would be punishable
readily. However, it would acknowledge that not all parents, no matter
how good or conscientious they are, can control all children all the time.
Where a child has an opportunity to see a non-custodial parent, and the
custodial parent has used encouragement and discipline to ensure the
visit takes place, it may not be within the realistic power of the custodial
parent to force a resistant child to actually visit. Acknowledging this
puts part of the responsibility to develop a relationship the child will
want to continue on the non-custodial parent.
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Obviously, it makes sense to use a higher standard for parental
discipline with children from birth to age ten because parents have more
actual control over younger children. From ages ten to eighteen, it
would make sense to refer warring parents and children to mediation, in
the absence of actual evidence of parental interference or total inaction.
This would force both the child and the parents to work out some sort of
compromise, which is what will be necessary for a meaningful
relationship anyway.
Courts could apply a similar rebuttable presumption in truancy cases
as well. A parent could rebut a presumption that he or she is
responsible for a child's failure to attend school with evidence that the
parent had taken actual, reasonable steps to avert the truancy. Examples
would include getting the child up in the morning, arranging for reliable
transportation, and imposing disciplinary consequences for school
absences. Evidence that the parent had colluded in the truancy by, for
example, making excuses for the child or using the child's services
(such as babysitting) during the truancy, would reinforce the
presumption and make the parent vulnerable to a fine or other
consequence.
Use of an explicitly stated presumption, along with recognized types
of rebuttal or reinforcement evidence, would go a long way toward
ensuring justice in these cases. It would eliminate prejudices and
unstated theories about what "good" parents would do from subtly
influencing the outcome. Finally, it would force courts to articulate
what erring parents should have done to comply with the law.
Presumably that would offer a deterrence value (for the parents in
question and for other parents in their position) greater than vague
pronouncements that a parent has acted improperly.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to demonstrate that, while expectations
that parents will control the behavior of their adolescents may subtly
influence the law, there is little actual evidence that parents can do
anything other than influence (instead of control) their children. Rather
than automatically holding parents accountable when their offspring
stray, this Article suggests that the law use a rebuttable presumption that
parents are in control. The ability to rebut the presumption with
evidence of good, consistent (even if ineffective) parenting techniques
would be more just for parents who, through no fault of their own,
cannot force their children to be law-abiding. The author hopes that this
approach would enable parents of recalcitrant children to focus their
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energies on dealing with those children, rather than focusing their
energies on legal defenses.

